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ABSTRACT
Knowledge acquisition is often considered a "bottleneck"
in the development of expert systems. This study conducted a
review of 14 knowledge acquisition methods with a survey of
knowledge types, task characteristics, and representation
schemes. All of the knowledge acquisition techniques are
considered deficient in their ability to capture a
representation of an expert's mental model and procedural
knowledge.
Cognitive feedback and the lens model, drawn from Egon
Brunswik's probabilistic functionalism, are proposed as an
alternative knowledge acquisition methodology. Cognitive
feedback's theoretical underpinnings are explained as are the
various uses to which it has been put. A summary of the many
research studies conducted into the effectiveness of cognitive
feedback is presented. An automated knowledge acquisition
tool using cognitive feedback is proposed and illustrated with
state transition diagrams and sample computer screens.
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Expert Systems are rapidly gaining in popularity
throughout a wide range of applications. The fascination with
these systems is evidenced by the increasing number of expert
system related articles appearing in academic journals and
business publications (Olson and Rueter, 1987). Successful
expert systems are currently being used to solve problems in
such diverse fields as space shuttle crew planning, oil
drilling, tactical air targeting, tax planning, Soviet radar
systems identification, and wine selection (Waterman, 1986).
An expert system is a computer system that uses the
experience and knowledge of one or more experts within a
particular problem domain. The expert system's knowledge base
is its store of domain specific knowledge and is symbolically
represented, usually but not always, in the form of facts or
rules. The knowledge base is kept separate from the reasoning
mechanism or inference engine. These are the methods by which
the symbolic knowledge is manipulated to arrive at a solution.
Knowledge engineering is the term given to the entire process
of information accumulation, representation, and manipulation.
Central to the knowledge engineering process is the
acquisition of knowledge from an expert. (Boose, 1986)
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The acquisition of knowledge is one of the most difficult
steps in the development of a knowledge base. This is due to
the differences that exist between an expert's knowledge and
what he or she can successfully articulate. What cannot be
articulated is known as implicit knowledge and few methods are
able to extract this from an expert. A gap is created in the
body of knowledge acquisition techniques because most of the
methods rely on the expert to consciously access information
or they assume some underlying organization. The cause of
this gap is that some knowledge may not be consciously
accessible or known, a priori, to exist in a particular form.
(Berry, 1987)
Cognitive feedback is a technique that returns some
elements of output from a decision maker's cognitive
processes, enabling the decision maker to solve a problem more
effectively. This process captures and refines the decision
maker's judgement rules, permitting the application of the
knowledge again at some point in the future. Research has
proven the effectiveness of this technique as an aid for
representing domain knowledge (Balzer, Doherty, and O'Connor,
1989). Cognitive feedback is proposed to fill the gaps that
exist in the body of knowledge acquisition techniques.
1. The Importance of Knowledge Acquisition
The knowledge in an expert system may be derived from
many different sources: textbooks, reports, data bases, case
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studies, empirical data, and personal experience. The primary
source, however, is the domain expert, the individual with the
expertise in the field of interest. The knowledge engineer
must usually obtain this knowledge through direct interaction
with the expert. (Boose, 1986)
The knowledge acquisition phase is central to the
development of an expert system because the power and utility
of the resulting product is dependent upon the quality of the
underlying representations. The determinants of that quality
seem to rest with domain knowledge rather than the complexity
of the formal reasoning methods employed. This is because
many difficult tasks resist the exact specifications necessary
for traditional algorithmic methods. (Garg-Janardan and
Salvendy, 1987)
2. The Proolems of Knowledge Acquisition
Knowledge acquisition is the crucial first step in the
development of expert systems. In traditional methods of
standard software development most of the time is spent on
coding. However, most time spent on the development of expert
systems is consumed by this first step, the planning and
deciding of what knowledge to include, followed by the actual
extraction of the information from the expert. (Harmon and
King, 1985; Waterman, 1986)
The actual elicitation of knowledge is highly
problematic because experts possess much information that is
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cognitively complex, pragmatic, and tacitly formulated.
Getting at this information is not possible in a standard
interviewing situation that deals predominantly with facts
without recourse to their schematic foundations. Often the
expert will not be able to adequately access the knowledge so
it can be easily represented in a program. It is also
difficult to determine when that information is correct,
consistent, and complete. (Berry, 1987)
3. Implications for Expert System Development
The time required by the knowledge acquisition phase
consumes an inordinate amount of the six to 24 months it takes
to develop an expert level prototype (Boose, 1985). The
traditional approach to knowledge acquisition uses a knowledge
engineer who typically spends a period of "apprenticeship"
within the domain. The knowledge engineer must also be well
versed in several f elds of computer science and computer
systems. Such incividuals are becoming increasingly harder to
find as the pace of demand outstrips the supply of knowledge
engineers. (Shaw and Gaines, 1987a)
The reliance upon knowledge engineers creates problems
for knowledge acquisition in other ways, as well. The
knowledge engineer-expert interaction is often mismatched
because the engineer is usually a novice at the outset. They
will not be seeing the same thing even when both are
discussing the same phenomena. This results in an inability
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to take account of the greater abstraction possessed by the
expert and risks development of a shallow and narrowly useful
knowledge base. The knowledge engineer, in effect, acts as an
imperfect filter for the knowledge that is passed from the
expert to the knowledge base. (Berry, 1987) This continuing
reliance upon human labor is contrary to other trends within
the industry. The human labor expenses become a dominating
constraint as prices for system technology drop. (Shaw and
Gaines, 1987a)
B. THE PROBLEM
The background has presented two primary problems with
respect to the knowledge acquisition phase of expert systems
development. First, the nature of expert knowledge is such
that much time is spent on extracting it. Once obtained there
is no guarantee that it truly reflects the knowledge actually
held by the expert.
Second, the use of knowledge engineers in traditional
roles hinders translation of expertise and knowledge from the
expert to the knowledge base. The shortage of knowledge
engineers only exacerbates this problem by contributing to
project delay and increased cost.
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
This study has three primary objectives. The first is to
determine what gaps exist in current knowledge acquisition
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methodologies. Of special interest are those techniques which
purport to extract the implicit or tacit types of knowledge.
A second objective of this thesis is to determine whether
cognitive feedback is appropriate as a tool for filling the
gaps that exist in knowledge acquisition. Effort is primarily
directed toward determining if cognitive feedback is capable
of extracting types of knowledge that other techniques cannot.
The third objective is to determine how cognitive feedback
can be put to use for extracting an individual's knowledge.
To this end, the high level specifications of an automated
knowledge acquisition tool will be generated.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study will address three primary questions. The
first is: Can any of the current knowledge acquisition
techniques satisfactorily elicit the special knowledge that
experts possess? Secondarily:
-- What is the nature of an expert's knowledge?
-- Once the knowledge is elicited, what are the ways of
representing this knowledge?
-- Can the nature of a task influence the knowledge
acquisition strategy?
-- Are some acquisition techniques more suited to one type
of task than another?
-- What are the strengths and weaknesses of each knowledge
acquisition methodology?
The second question addressed by this thesis is: Can
cognitive feedback be used in the knowledge extraction
process? Secondarily:
- - • m m m6
-- What is cognitive feedback and what are its theoretical
underpinnings?
-- How is cognitive feedback operationalized?
-- Is cognitive feedback better than other types of
feedback?
-- How is the knowledge captured by cognitive feedback
represented?
-- Has cognitive feedback been empirically validated?
-- Are there other uses for cognitive feedback?
The last question addressed is: Can cognitive feedback
can be used in an automated knowledge acquisition tool?
Secondarily:
-- What is a likely high level specification for such a
tool?
-- How would the tool work?
-- Can such a tool decrease reliance on knowledge
engineers?
E. SCOPF
This research focuses on determining whether cognitive
feedback can make a contribution to the field of knowledge
engineering. The gaps uncovered in the current knowledge
acquisition techniques, with information drawn from studies on
cognitive feedback, will be considered for a high level
specification of an automated knowledge acquisition tool.
This research does not involve empirical studies of any kind.
The actual cod4ng of the automated knowledge acquisition tool
is the subject of a follow-on thesis.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is divided into three main sections excluding
the introduction and conclusion. The first major section,
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Chapter II, is a survey of current knowledge acquisition
techniques. The chapter begins with background regarding the
various types of knowledge and how an expert's knowledge is
unique. Different knowledge representation schemes and how
these are important to knowledge acquisition are presented.
Task characteristics are detailed along with a theory for
their classification. The body of the chapter is composed of
a brief summary and a list of advantages and disadvantages for
each of 14 knowledge elicitation methods.
The second major section, Chapter III, concerns the theory
from which cognitive feedback has been derived, Brunswik's
probabilistic functionalism. The operationalization of the
theory, in the lens model, is presented and the notion of
feedback in general is discussed. Cognitive feedback is
defined in detail and contrasted with another form of
feedback, outcome feedback. The mathematical representations
of the knowledge captured by cognitive feedback are outlined.
Empirical studies regarding the effectiveness of cognitive
feedback are summarized.
The third major section, Chapter IV, is a proposed
automated knowledge acquisition tool that uses cognitive
feedback. It is set within the context of a simple personnel
evaluation for promotability task.
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II. KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION TECHNIQUES AND
METHODOLOGIES: A SURVEY
A. INTRODUCTION
Knowledge Acquisition has long been recognized as the
"bottleneck" in the development of expert systems (Harmon and
King 1985; Waterman, 1986). The source of this difficulty
lies in the varied and intricate nature of expert knowledge.
Any expert has knowledge that is explicit and objective, as
well as knowledge that is more implicitly formulated (Hawkins,
1983). The latter is usually very difficult for experts to
articulate (Broadbent, Fitzgerald, and Broadbent, 1986).
Knowledge acquisition techniques that consist of standard
interview methods or unstructured think-aloud protocols may
bias the knowledge engineer into fixating on those aspects of
the task that can be well represented within if/then, rule
based systems. The resulting knowledge base may then lack
vital components of the expert's knowledge (Bainbridge, 1979).
It is important to recognize then, that a domain expert
will possess knowledge of several different kinds (Berry,
1987). Each type of knowledge demands a technique that can
most effectively capture it. The technique must transform this
knowledge to a representation suitable for the inference
strategy used in the problem solving process. Rather than use
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a single knowledge acquisition technique, several techniques
should be employed, with each matched to a different kind of
knowledge (Gammack and Young, 1985).
The nature of the task is an important feature that should
be explored when the components of an expert's knowledge are
investigated. The nature of the task is salient in that it
determines the possible strategies an expert uses to complete
or solve a task (Hogarth, 1974). When the particular problem
solving task is isolated and identified, the type of knowledge
necessary to solve that nroblem, independent of any particular
implementation, should be analyzed and described. This
enables the knowledge engineer to decompose the expert's
compiled knowledge and to identify discrete tasks, types of
knowledge being processed, and the relationships among the
data, facts, and procedures (McGraw and Riner, 1987).
Before describing the role that cognitive feedback can
play in the knowledge acquisition process it is necessary to
identify where gaps in the current methodologies and
techniques exist. This chapter presents a survey of the
current state of the art in knowledge acquisition by first
examining knowledge types, knowledge representations, and task
types. This is followed by an analysis of different knowledge
elicitation techniques.
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B. TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE
Selection of the appropriate knowledge acquisition
technique requires that the knowledge engineer recognize the
type of knowledge within the domain under investigation.
Major problems within knowledge engineering include
recognition and analysis of domain knowledge and selection of
an appropriate knowledge acquisition technique. There exists
today several methodologies for the classification of
knowledge, no one of which is universally accepted. McGraw
and Riner employ a widely accepted scheme to classify
knowledge into four basic types: procedural, declarative,
semantic, and episodic. (McGraw and Riner, 1987)
1. Procedural Knowledge
This includes the skills that an individual knows. It
may involve an automatic response to a stimulus, and can be
reactionary in nature. Such skills are deeply ingrained and
linked sequentially, one step serving as the trigger for
completing the next. This knowledge is implicit and highly
compiled so that the expert will have great difficulty in both
identifying and verbalizing it and therefore is of primary
interest to knowledge engineers (McGraw and Riner, 1987).
When individuals master increasingly more knowledge to carry
out a task efficiently, they also lose awareness of what they
know. This has been called the "paradox of expertise"
(Johnson, 1983).
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Procedural knowledge is not necessarily motor in
nature. Knowledge of one's native language is procedural.
While most people have this knowledge, they find it difficult
to describe precisely the rules of usage. This type of
knowledge may also include that which is gained from implicit
learning or an unconscious process such as socialization,
perception, and the rules of complex games. (Gammack and
Young, 1985)
2. Declarative Knowledge
This represents surface level information that experts
can verbalize. The primary distinction between this and
procedural knowledge is the ability to verbalize or express
it. Declarative knowledge is what the expert is conscious of
knowing. Therefore, it may not adequately reflect the
cognitive foundations and concepts that will convey the
expert's information in a meaningful way. This type of
knowledge is relatively easy to acquire. (McGraw and Riner,
1987)
3. Semantic Knowledge
This represents one of the two theoretical types of
long term memory. It reflects cognitive structure,
organization, and representation. As a result it will be
difficult for experts to express. Because this type of
knowledge includes memories for vocabulary, concepts, facts,
definitions, and relationships among facts, it too is of
12
importance to knowledge engineers. It is semantic information
that determines whether the expert system actually emulates
the work of an expert in the given domain. It will present
problems with regard to identification and retrieval. (McGraw
and Riner, 1987)
4. Episodic Knowledge
This is autobiographical, experience-oriented
information that the expert has grouped or chunked by episodes
and is the second theoretical type of long term memory. It
consists of information organized by time and place of
occurrence, and often may be described in terms of perceptual
characteristics. This is highly compiled information and is
one of the most difficult types of knowledge to extract and
dissect. Since this knowledge is chunked, the expert may or
may not be aware of the separate knowledge entities and
decision-making processes used to complete the task. (McGraw
and Riner, 1987)
C. KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION SCHEMES
Selection of an appropriate knowledge representation
scheme is critical in the development of an expert system.
Psychological evidence suggests that there should be different
representations for each type of knowledge. The representation
scheme should aim at simulating the essentials of suspected
basic mental models in humans. (Rouse and Morris, 1986)
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An important distinction with respect to the form of
mental models is whether they are spatial or verbal in nature.
Since pattern recognition in human beings is highly developed,
it is likely that the processing and storage of spatially
oriented information is highly developed as well. Mental
models may frequently be pictorial or graphic-like instead of
symbolic, as in list-processing. This will present
difficulties when experts attempt to verbalize their models.
Additionally, the mental models may be dynamic objects with a
variety of forms, even for a certain person in a precise
situation. (Rouse and Morris, 1986)
The selection of a representation is therefore crucial. It
must allow for both a natural mapping of the body of knowledge
and an inference mechanism or algorithm that can effectively
operate on that representation. A representation also should
satisfy three requirements. First, it should have sufficient
expressive power. Second, it should possess uniform
readability. This means that an expression can be read
independently of where it occurs in the program and
independently even of the program itself. Third, it should
ensure a preservation of structures: the many
interconnections between pieces of knowledge must remain
intact. These interconnections support the problem solving
process. (Richter, 1986)
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What follows is a brief discussion of the most common
forms of knowledge representation: production rules, object-
attribute-values, semantic nets, frames, decision trees,
inference networks, and predicate logic.
1. Production Rules
A production rule is the term used by cognitive
psychologists to describe an if-then rule. A production
system has a data base of production rules and a control
mechanism that selects applicable production rules to reach a
goal state. A major use of these systems has been to model
human cognition, specifically the problem solving techniques
that involve a search process. Production systems are
particularly suited to the representation of procedural
knowledge. (Harmon and King, 1985)
2. Object-Attribute-Value Triplets
O-A-V triplets are useful for the representation of
factual knowledge. An object is an actual or conceptual item
within the expert's domain. An object's properties are called
attributes and they can assume many different values. (Harmon
and King, 1985)
This scheme is a specialized case of the semantic
network described below. Complicated links are simplified in
favor of just two relationships. The object-attribute link is
a "has-a" link and the attribute-value link is an "is-a" link.
(Harmon and King, 1985)
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3. Semantic Nets
This is a type of knowledge representation that
portrays objects and values as nodes. The nodes are connected
with arcs or links that describe relationships between the
many nodes. The nodes represent objects and descriptors and
the links relate objects and descriptors. Some links are
definitional while others may capture heuristics. Flexibility
and inheritance are two major features of these networks that
attempt to comprise categorical and role-related hierarchical
organization of knowledge. (Harmon and King, 1985)
4. Frames
This representation scheme relates an object with a
assemblage of features. Each of the features are saved in a
slot. A frame is that collection of slots associated with a
specific object. Slots may also contain default values, A
pointers to other frames, rule sets, or methods (procedural
attachments) by which values may be obtained. When compared
to traditional computer programming, a frame is similar to a
property list, schema, or record. (Harmon and King, 1985)
Frames allow for more inventive representations of
knowledge but they are also more sophisticated and difficult
to develop than the simpler O-A-V or rule systems. Frames can
join into a single representation scheme both procedural and
declarative knowledge. This is known as situation related
knowledge. (Harmon and King, 1985)
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5. Decision Trees
A decision tree is similar to a flow chart, but has
nodes and branches. Terminal nodes are those at the bottom
while those above are intermediate nodes. A path, determined
by the values of attributes described in the intermediate
nodes, branches down the tree until a terminal node, or
decision is reached (Hart, 1986). This structure is useful
for describing expert information that may be stored in a
hierarchical flow (Olson and Rueter, 1987).
6. Inference Networks
An inference network is a diagram consisting of boxes
that represent attributes, or states and rules, and they are
generated from rule based systems. Attributes within the
network are data (i.e., observations, facts) that form
preconditions to some rules and targets for others. The rules
form a large inference net between attributes. All possible
inference chains that can be generated from the rules can also
be interpreted as connections between evidence and hypotheses.
Inference networks are versatile tools but are best for small
rule bases as they can quickly become very complicated.
(Waterman, 1986)
7. Predicate Logic
Predicate Logic lends itself to mapping propositions
about arbitrary objects into a theory with well known
mathematical properties. This is an extension of
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propositional logic. Each elementary unit is called an
object, and statements about the objects are called
predicates. Logic provides a way to assert facts about the
world, but seeking values in this system is not as direct as
seeking values in the systems described above. This is
because when a fact is stated it is either true or false.
Still, a good deal of theoretical refinement can be achieved
when logic is used to codify a suitable knowledge domain.
(Harmon and King, 1985)
n- TASK CHARACTERISTICS
Identification of the application task characteristics is
important because this will influence selection of the
knowledge acquisition tool and the strategies to be applied in
building and refining the knowledge base. The characteristics
of the task affect the manner in which an expert will store
and access task-critical knowledge, and will determine the
problem-solving strategy. Expert knowledge is task centered,
so analyzing the processing states and considerations an
expert applies when performing a task or making a decision is
key to attaining an initial understanding of the domain. An
expert system should not merely capture a static
representation of a knowledge domain, it also should simulate
a particular problem-solving task within that domain.
(Riesbeck, 1984)
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Artificial Intelligence currently lacks a universal theory
that will map existing expert system tools or shells onto the
categories of tasks that they can solve (Kidd, 1987). Indeed,
there is no universal theory that will categorize all possible
types of problem-solving tasks. However, Kitto and Boose
(1989) summarize a widely used classification of application
tasks. Generic applications can be divided into the task
categories of interpretation, prediction, diagnosis, design,
planning, monitoring, debugging, repair, instruction, and
control. These can then be gathered into two broad groups:
those associated with analysis (interpretive) tasks, and those
concerned with synthesis (constructive) tasks.
Analysis tasks include diagnosis, interpretation,
debugging, and identification. Synthesis tasks include
design, evaluation, configuration, scheduling, and planning.
Analysis-Synthesis tasks include control, instruction,
monitoring, prediction, and repair. (Hayes-Roth, Klahr, and
Mostow, 1986)
Once a classification scheme for application tasks is
selected, the appropriate problem solving method is
identified. The knowledge acquisition tool then provides the
link between the application task and the problem-solving
methodology. The tool must elicit the information necessary
to meet the special problem-solving requirements of an
application task category. (Kitto and Boose, 1989)
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Two basic problem solving methods exist: heuristic
classification and heuristic construction. Each of these can
be applied to a wide range of application tasks. Heuristic
classification is best suited to analysis tasks. This is a
method in which concepts in different classification
hierarchies are heuristically related using a process of data
abstraction, heuristic matching and solution refinement.
Heuristic construction, on the other hand, is most appropriate
to synthesis tasks. With this method, the problem solver
constructs solutions, either by generating complete solutions
or assembling solutions from components while satisfying
constraints. (Clancey, 1986)
Table 1 illustrates what problem-solving methods are
supported by existing knowledge acquisition systems in a
particular application task category. For example, the
knowledge acquisition systems MDIS, MORE, MOLE, TEIRESIAS,
ROGET, and TKAW enable diagnostic application tasks to use the
heuristic classification problem-solving method. Knowledge
acquisition tools do not currently exist for certain
application types within each category. Most current
acquisition tools support one problem-solving method, but it
is possible for a complex application to require several
problem-solving methods to resolve the total problem. (Kitto
and Boose, 1989)
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TABLE 1. KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION TOOLS LINK APPLICATION TASKS
TO PROBLEM SOLVING METHODS.
Problem-Solving Knowledge Application Task
Method Acquisition Tool Category
Heuristic MDIS, MOLE, MORE, Analysis


























E. KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION TECHNIQUES
This section explores the actual techniques used in
extracting knowledge from experts. It is exactly this phase
that has become known as the "bottleneck" in the development
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of an expert system. This phase is also known as "knowledge
extraction" and "knowledge acquisition". It refers to the
transfer and transformation of problem-solving expertise from
a knowledge source (i.e., human expert, documents) to a
program (Hayes-Roth et al, 1986).
Several methods have been developed for knowledge
acquisition, and no single technique is usually used to the
exclusion of others. Sometimes a combination approach may be
used while in other circumstances different techniques may be
appropriate to different stages of the acquisition process.
When selecting a specific technique a knowledge engineer
should identify and isolate the problem-solving task to be
simulated. Then the type of knowledge necessary to solve that
problem should be described and analyzed, independent of any
particular implementation. (Kidd, 1987)
The techniques described here are those most widely noted
in the literature of knowledge acquisition and cognitive
psychology, and those most widely used by knowledge engineers.
Each is briefly described along with its advantages and
disadvantages, type of knowledge or task it is most applicable
to, and what existing automated tools are supported.
The first seven methods (Interview, Questionnaire, On-site
Observation, Interruption Analysis, Protocol Analysis, Drawing
Closed Curves, Inferential Flow Analysis) can be described as
"direct". These techniques ask the expert to report on
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knowledge that he or she can directly articulate. They are
free form, so the possibility exists for the knowledge
engineer to find any type of information. The most likely
type of knowledge that will be uncovered is declarative or
surface knowledge. These methods will extract only what the
expert is able to verbalize and overreliance on these
techniques will exclude important information. (Olson and
Rueter, 1987)
The next seven techniques (Multidimensional Scaling,
Hierarchical Clustering, General Weighted Networks, Ordered
Trees from Recall, Repertory Grid Analysis, Decision Analysis,
Machine Induction) can be described as "indirect". These do
not rely on the expert's ability to articulate the information
used. They collect other behaviors from which the knowledge
engineer makes inferences about what the expert must have
known to perform as he or she did. These may uncover a deeper
(procedural or semantic) knowledge, but will involve
assumptions about the underlying form of the representation
employed by the expert. Therefore, these techniques could be
misused to the extent that their basic assumptions are not
supported by the data. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
1. Interviews
The interview is the most common technique for the
elicitation of domain knowledge from an expert (Gammack and
Young, 1985). Interviews quickly allow the knowledge engineer
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to grasp important domain concepts and vocabulary. The expert
may reveal the objects he or she thinks about, how they are
related, the judgmental processes used in solving a problem,
and some inference rules (Olson and Rueter, 1987). This can
be the most free form of the direct methods and is the most
likely to uncover unexpected information. Most interviews are
conducted in an unstructured form and will seldom provide
complete or well organized descriptions of cognitive processes
(Olson and Rueter, 1987).
The breadth and accuracy of what can be extracted in
this free form style soon reaches a limit (Olson and Rueter,
1987). At this point the knowledge engineer should switch to
focused or structured interviews that involve careful
preplanning of the questions and their order. This represents
a more goal oriented approach that may uncover additional data
on factual knowledge, types of problems, functions of
expertise, and explanations. (Kidd, 1987)
All interviews are most appropriate to uncovering only
declarative or surface forms of knowledge. Since this
technique ultimately relies on the expert's ability to
articulate what he or she knows, much information will not be
uncovered (i.e., procedural and semantic knowledge). This
technique will not reveal how an expert's thinking or deeply
compiled mental processing is conducted. Interviews
therefore, are good only for the initial knowledge acquisition
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sessions (Olson and Rueter, 1987). There are several
automated knowledge acquisition tools based on some form of
the interview (see Table 2).
TABLE 2. KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION TOOLS BASED ON INTERVIEW
TECHNIQUES.
TOOL SOURCE




KNACK Klinker, Boyd, Genetet,
and McDermott, (1987)
KADS Breuker and Weilinga (1987)
TEIRESIAS Davis (1979)
2. Questionnaires
Questionnaires can be a much more efficient way of
gathering information than interviews, which are very time
consuming. These questions are not similar to statistical
surveys, they are open-ended and very much like those
presented in an interview. The expert usually feels more in
control and can fill out the questionnaires at his or her
convenience, without the pressure of a one-on-one session with
a knowledge engineer. This technique is particularly useful
in uncovering the objects of the domain with its relationships
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and uncertainties (if instructed to attach these to
conclusions). (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
Most people are very poor at estimating probabilities,
they will overestimate low ones and underestimate high ones
(von Winterfeldt, 1988). So, verbal responses to questions
requiring probabilities will be unreliable. Questionnaires
can overcome this problem by eliciting probability estimates
with pro-formatted response scales. Two examples of this are
the bar on which the expert marks a point to indicate degree
of uncertainty, or a five point verbal scale on which the
expert checks the description most closely associated with
their impression of certainty. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
The questionnaire is useful for illuminating the
objects, relations, and inference rules of a domain. This
method is similar to interviews in that it relies on the
expert's introspection and articulation. Deep causal
knowledge of the procedural or semantic kind will not usually
be extracted through this method. Therefore, this technique
is best for uncovering declarative knowledge early in the
acquisition process. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
3. On-site Observation
On-site observation involves the knowledge engineer
observing the expert solving real problems on the job instead
of invented but reasonable problems in a laboratory setting.
The knowledge engineer does not interfere but acts as a silent
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observer. This approach lends insight into the complexity of
the problem. This method also gives the knowledge engineer
some idea of the interface required for the finished system to
operate in the field. This technique is not appropriate to
those domains where privacy or time is a limitation. It is
appropriate however for discovering an expert's judgment,
diagnosis, or design decision, if the task is normally
conducted in a relaxed atmosphere. This technique also may
uncover the objects, relations, and inference rules of a
domain. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
This method has several disadvantages, which include
the observer bias of the knowledge engineer and time pressure.
The knowledge engineer may not understand the significance of
a particular action or the underlying decisions that led to
it. Discussions with the expert afterward will rely upon the
expert's introspection and articulation of the process. The
expert may not be able to verbalize everything. Details
regarding all of the knowledge or mental processes will not be
available. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
4. Interruption Analysis
On-site observation becomes interruption analysis at
the point where the knowledge engineer can no longer
understand the expert's thought processes and interrupts.
This method will capture the same types of knowledge and
information as will on-site observation. It has the added
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advantage of instantly capturing the core of the eYpert's
concentration and the types of decisions made for the
accompanying procedures. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
Interruption Analysis has the same disadvantages as
on-site observation. While this technique can be very
illuminating about the procedure observed, there is little
chance that this process can be resumed in a way that will
leave it unaffected by the interruption. This technique may
be most valuable when the expert system is coded and in the
prototype stage; then the expert's performance is compared to
that of the system's in an effort to find discrepancies.
(Olson and Rueter, 1987)
5. Protocol Analysis
Protocol analysis has been widely used for many years
as a technique for knowledge acquisition. This method is
still widely regarded as a solution to the problem of experts
providing unreliable answers when recalling information and
tasks about the domain in question. The expert is observed
actually solving problems and must concurrently verbalize the
decisions made during the task. The dialogue is recorded and
later analyzed for the expert's problem solving strategies.
This may be useful for eliciting some procedures that experts
use, but may be unable to articulate. The intent (mistakenly)
has been to use this technique as a tool to extract implicit
or procedural knowledge. (Gammack and Young, 1985)
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This method has several drawbacks. The knowledge
engineer must be sufficiently familiar with the domain to
understand the expert's task and commentary. Running
commentaries may be difficult for the expert and will affect
the task being performed. It is useful only for those tasks
in which articulation is a natural part of thinking. It may
prove counterproductive in those instances where unique
language is used or where the aloud explaining may be
distorted or even wrong. The explanations may arrogate
attention and energy from perceptual-motor tasks and prove
distracting to the expert. (Berry and Broadbent, 1984)
Protocols are often incomplete and cannot establish
the boundaries of an expert's knowledge (Berry, 1987). This
is because protocol analysis relies on the expert's ability to
introspect and articulate. The expert simply does not have
access to all their knowledge and mental processes. The
deficiency of this technique is noted by Burton and Shadbolt
(1988) in their empirical study of knowledge elicitation
techniques. Protocol analysis yielded significantly worse
results when compared to other methods. It retrieved less
information and took a longer amount of time. Laboratory
studies show that concurrent verbalization can affect the way
in which an expert will perform a task (Berry and Broadbent,
1984). It may force an expert to choose a different line of
reasoning than would otherwise be the case.
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In light of the latest studies involving protocol
analysis, this technique is unlikely to uncover knowledge that
resides deeper than surface or declarative knowledge. As a
tool for eliciting deep knowledge of the procedural or
semantic type, it suffers from substantial weaknesses (Rouse
and Morris, 1986).
6. Drawing Closed Curves
This is a direct method that unlike the previous
techniques, does not attempt to reveal cognitive processes
during the solution of a problem. The previous methods
highlight vocabulary used to express objects along with their
links to one another and the types of inferences drawn. They
do not draw out the form of the relationships, be it networks,
tables, lists, or physical space. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
The drawing of closed curves is a specialized method
designed for extracting those relationships that are assumed
to be coded in a physical space. This technique requires the
expert to show which of a collection of physical objects
belong together. A line, in the form of a closed curve, is
drawn around those objects that are in some way associated.
(Reitman, 1976)
The advantages of this method are that it is graphical
and no verbalization is required. It can be applied to any
spatial representation, such as a X-ray or CAT scan, a
position on a game board, or a typeset formula. Knowledge
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obtained in this manner is most often represented as networks
or as a physical space of some sort. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
The disadvantages of this technique are much like
those for the previous techniques. Though no verbalization is
required, this method still relies on the expert's
introspection and articulation. Access to deeper knowledge
and mental processes may be limited. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
7. Inferential Flow Analysis
This is an adaptation of the interview. With this
technique, the expert answers particular questions regarding
causal relations. A causal network is then built
incor-porating all the objects within the domain of interest.
The expert initially provides a list of some key objects
within the aomain. The knowledge engineer questions the
expert about relations between two of the objects. The
answers will reveal linkages between objects and the
directions of those linkages. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
The expert's responses over a set of questions should
reveal consistencies in associations between intervening
objects. Each time an object is mentioned by the expert in an
answer, it is linked with previous objects and the association
is labelled either positive or negative. The linked objects
are joined in a network with weights assigned to each link.
The weighting on a link is raised in strength with each
subsequent mention of that link. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
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The resulting network, though appearing somewhat
contrived, is balanced and agreeable with other sets of
behaviors. Knowledge extracted by this method is most often
represented as flows or networks. This technique is simple to
employ and most useful as a tool for displaying to the expert
facets of the knowledge they have so far revealed. The
resulting display can be used constructively as a springboard
for further interviews. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
The disadvantage of this technique is that it is good
only for that which can be expressed as relationships between
objects. This method too, relies on the introspection and
articulation of the expert who may not have access to all
details of knowledge or mental processes. (Olson and Rueter,
1987)
8. Multidimensional Scaling
Multidimensional scaling refers to a group of
techniques for deriving structure from a matrix of data.
These data are usually measures of relatedness among a set of
objects whose underlying dimensions of classification are not
well known, but are assumed to vary along a translatable
number of dimensions. Therefore, this procedure should only
be used on data that are assumed to have come from stored
models of multi-dimensional space. The knowledge obtained from
this method, which is primarily declarative, can be
represented in lists, tables, or physical space. (Null, 1980)
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This technique involves having the expert compare each
object as it is paired successively with the others. Then he
or she gives an estimate of the objects similarity by
answering the set of questions: "How similar are A and B?".
The objects should be typical of the larger domain from which
they are drawn. So all objects are judged on a similar basis
they should comprise a relatively uniform set without
including plainly unusual items. Examples are differentiating
flavors of cola drinks or comparing farm animals. (Gammack,
1987)
The similarity estimates provided by the expert are
assumed to be balanced and comparable, and able assume a
continuous value. From the expert's solution set an
explanation can be offered about the nature of the dimensions
that distinguish the objects. This is done by arranging the
similarity judgments in a half-matrix. This is then input to
an analysis program that scans for the best position of these
objects in a space of user specified dimension. A "stress",
measuring deviation from a perfect fit, is assigned to each
dimensional solution. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
The knowledge engineer selects the lowest "stress"
measurements with the fewest dimensions and plots them. The
plot is examined for the best placement of the axes. A
suitable labelling scheme must be chosen for the axes. For
example, size versus ferocity when comparing jungle animals.
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This procedure produces significant clusters of objects,
relations, and outliers on the plot. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
A variation on multidimensional scaling is the card
sort. This provides a qualitative multidimensional mapping of
the elements in the domain. This is done through repeated
sorts of a deck of cards, each of which is marked with a
domain element. With each sort, the expert labels the overall
scale and the individual piles. Rules are then extracted
through classification matches. (Burton, Shadbol Hedgecock,
and Rugg, 1988)
Advantages of this technique include its
straightforward manner and the production of quantitative
information not present with many other methods. This method
may provide a complementary view to a hierarchy by using
cross-sectional data on similarities to uncover important
global features. It is best when used on sets of low
dimensionality and may cause a knowledge intensive activity to
deliver large amounts of information. (Gammack, 1987)
Disadvantages of this technique include the tedium of
collecting the data. Pairing comparisons of even a small set
of objects can very quickly run into the hundreds or thousands
and interpretation of the results is not very straightforward.
It is difficult for the knowledge engineer to find the
dimension with the best "stress" value and then determine
placement and names for the axes (Olson and Rueter, 1987).
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This method is inappropriate when used on objects that vary in
too many dimensions or when too few dimensions are common to
all (Gammack, 1987). Another problem with inferring the
underlying structure in this manner is that assumptions, which
may not be correct, must be made about the underlying
representation. (Olson and Rueter, 1987).
9. Hierarchical Clustering
Hierarchical clustering is similar to multidimensional
scaling in that it begins with a half matrix of similarity
judgments. The assumptions that underlie this technique are
the opposite of those for multidimensional scaling.
Multidimensional scaling presupposes symmetric distances and
ranked properties, whereas this technique just assumes that an
object belongs to a cluster or not. Objects cannot
simultaneously satisfy assumptions for both multidimensional
scaling and hierarchical clustering. This technique is too
often misused by some when used to show "clusters" of points
on a multidimensional scaling system. (Olson and Rueter,
1987)
This technique uses an uncomplicated algorithm that
begins with the half matrix and ends with a hierarchical
organization of the objects. Pairs of objects that are
neighbors in the matrix are joined to a single cluster, and a
new matrix drawn with that cluster representing a new object.
This process is iterative, and with each new matrix the
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distances between unclustered objects are copied from the
original matrix. Then, a joining algorithm is selected. The
distances between objects and clusters are figured as either
the maximum, minimum, or average distance of all cluster
objects (all objects within that new cluster) to the object.
This results in a hierarchical tree diagram with all the
objects listed at the bottom as terminal nodes. The degree of
similarity is shown by how far up the tree one must go until
two objects become members of the same overarching category.
(Olson and Rueter, 1987)
The advantage of this procedure is that it can be
accomplished with just a pencil and paper. Additionally, this
technique may help the expert identify a structure that they
recognize as a natural and effective way of describing some
underlying patterns. Knowledge obtained through this
technique is primarily represented as relations in
hierarchies, a form most people can easily relate to.
(Gammack, 1987)
There are several disadvantages of this method. The
half matrix which this technique begins with is tedious to
develop. If there is no firm theoretical justification for
selecting a certain joining algorithm, whether maximum,
minimum, or average, one must make an arbitrary choice. The
different algorithms will produce substantially different
hierarchies, making this technique a somewhat subjective
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analysis. As with multidimensional scaling, this is a
technique based on underlying assumptions and can be misused
to the extent that the assumptions are not supported. (Olson
and Rueter, 1987)
10. General Weighted Networks
General weighted networks are similar to the previous
two techniques in that an expert gives balanced pair-wise
distance judgments for all objects. It is assumed that the
network derives from the expert negotiating a mental network
of relations. The network has a primary path between each
pair of objects and possibly a secondarily coded path as well.
(Olson and Rueter, 1987)
The first step is to create a minimal connected
network from a distance matrix. It is formed by connecting
the most closely linked items. Then additional links are
added and the resulting structure is called a minimal
elaborated network. This second step adds a link only if it
is shorter than the links currently in the network between two
nodes. The network is then examined for dominating concepts
and members of cycles. Dominating concepts are those that
have many connections to several other nodes. :Aembers of
cycles are those that linked into circles. (Olson and Rueter,
1987)
A general weighted network created by an expert is
very different from that created by a novice. An expert's
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network is simpler, connecting larger integrated conceptual
structures. They can more easily identify link relations with
phrases such as "is-a", "affects", "desirable", etc. This
technique can reveal the notable features of expertise.
Knowledge obtained from this method is primarily represented
as a network but it also may provide lists, tables,
hierarchies, or physical models. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
The primary disadvantage of this technique is that it
assumes an underlying form. Like the previous techniques, it
relies loosely on the ability of the expert to make a single-
valued similarity judgment from whatever form it is stored in.
(Olson and Rueter, 1987)
11. Ordered Trees From Recall
Ordered trees from recall derive from research by
Reitman and Rueter into how memory structure differs between
experts and novices (Reitman and Rueter, 1980). This
technique does not begin with a distance matrix but with
recall trials. It starts by assuming whether objects belong
to a cluster or not, then builds upon a model of memory
organization that states an expert will remember all data from
a particular cluster before recalling data from another. The
basic assumption is that people recall from learned
organization. Knowledge obtained via this technique is
represented as lists or hierarchies. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
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Patterns found over the set of recalled data are
assumed to reflect memory organizaLiorn. The expertc recall
object names ten to twenty times and are sometimes told to
begin the recall with different names. Pauses during the
recall process suggest a transition from one chunk to another.
All objects recalled together are identified as chunks and are
scrutinized for regularities. The chunks are written into a
lattice, then redrawn into an ordered tree structure. The
objects are listed at the bottom of the tree as terminal
nodes. Horizontal arrows (to represent unidirectional or
bidirectional relationships) are drawn over chunk components
that were recalled consistently in a certain order. Computer
analysis can then be done on the tree structure, scanning for
indices of organization or outliers. When these are removed
the tree will exhibit a good deal more structure. (Olson and
Rueter, 1987)
This technique can be used to prove that experts will
show much more organization than novices in a particular
domain. Experts within the same domain will exhibit a high
degree of similarity with this method. Close analysis of the
ordered tree can uncover features of what the expert perceives
within their domain of expertise. (McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter,
and Hirtle, 1981)
A disadvantage of this technique may be the explicit
assumption upon which the entire methodology is based.
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Ordered trees assume that domain objects are stored in nested
clusters and that all objects of this cluster are recalled
before shifting to another cluster. The method relies heavily
upon the expert's ability at introspection and recali.
Additionally, the algorithm employed by the computer analysis
may be restricted in what it sees as outliers or indices of
organization. The analysis can be done by hand but it is
tedious and open to perceptual error by the knowledge
engineer. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
12. Repertory Grid Analysis
The repertory grid technique has its origins in
Personal Construct Theory developed by George Kelly in 1955.
This theory states that each person functions as a "scientist"
who classifies and organizes their own world. Based on these
classifications, the individual can construct personal
theories of how the particular domain functions. They can
then predict and act in that domain based on these theories.
When the expert's classifications have been identified and
their constructs analyzed, a repertory grid can be developed
to represent the expert's understanding of a specific object.
(Hart, 1986)
To develop a grid, the knowledge engineer first
elicits from the expert a set of constructs that are bipolar
in nature. Next, the expert provides a set of examples called
elements. The knowledge engineer then requests that the
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expert rate each element along a linear scale developed to
represent each construct. An example construct is "opaque-
transparent". The resultant linear scale has "opaque" at one
end and "transparent" at the opposite. The element (a type of
plastic) is rated on this scale by placing an "X" at the
appropriate point along the line. This represents the degree
of opaqueness or transparency it possesses. (Hart, 1986)
In the more traditional method of the grid elicitation
technique, and the one used by George Kelly, three elements
are presented to the expert who picks the odd one. The expert
names a dimension such that the odd one is at one pole and the
other two form the opposite pole. The remaining objects are
rated along this dimension and this is repeated until all
objects are distinct in multidimensional space. (Boose, 1986)
When each element is rated according to each
construct, the results may be analyzed with a variety of
techniques including factor analysis and cluster analysis (of
the objects or of the dimensions). The purpose of the
analysis is to measure similarities and distances among
objects and to represent these graphically as a grid. The
elements of the domain are used to define the scope of the
problem domain for the grid. The constructs are used to help
the expert make useful distinctions among the elements. (Hart,
1986)
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The finished grid becomes a cross-referencing system
between vital constructs and domain elements. This can be used
to find patterns or relations during initial knowledge
acquisition efforts (Hart, 1986). It also can be used for
extracting the objects, and inference rules of the expert's
domain (Olson and Rueter, 1987). This technique is better for
analysis problems (debugging, diagnosis, interpretation, and
classification) than for synthesis problems (Shaw and Gaines,
1987). It is particularly applicable to classification
problems, where features of a new object are observed and the
object sorted into one of the known categories (Olson and
Rueter, 1987).
This technique is one of the most complete and widely
used. Advantages include its free form recall and rating
sessions, and the production of a similarity matrix much less
tedious to produce than the direct similarity rating of pairs.
It also can be used to combine the expertise of two experts
within the same domain. (Olson and Rueter, 1987)
This technique has several disadvantages. It is
difficult to apply to deep procedural or semantic knowledge
(Shaw and Gaines, 1987). Repertory grid analysis elicits
traits and builds relationships, but does not find out much
about how or when this data is used in the problem-solving
process. The constructs used are strictly bipolar; it may be
more appropriate sometimes to describe a single trait that
42
could take on any number of discrete values. This technique
assumes that the set of elements provided by the expert
sufficiently represents the domain. It is more difficult to
verify that a representative set of constructs has been
extracted. Additionally, interrelationships between
constructs or between elements cannot be easily depicted
within the grid. (Boose, 1986)
Many knowledge acquisition tools have been based on
Personal Construct Theory (see Table 3). The tools based on
repertory grids can help a knowledge engineer determine the
expert's conceptualization of the domain. This is an
important precursor to follow-on efforts in organizing and
developing a knowledge base. Most of these tools interact
directly with the expert to stimulate them to refine, expand,
analyze, and test problem-solving knowledge. See Table 3 for
a list of some of these tools. (Boose, 1986)
13. Decision Analysis
Decision Analysis can be useful for capturing an
expert's inferences or decision rules within their domain.
Knowledge obtained via this method can be represented as an
inference network or decision tree, and a "knowledge
dictionary" of key concepts. It is a technique that has been
widely used in many areas of management and business. This
technique is fairly simple and straightforward. The knowledge
engineer asks the expert to list all possible decisions when
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confronted with a particular problem. For each of those
decisions all possible consequences are listed. The expert
must assess the worth of each consequence and its probability
of occurrence. The expected worth of each consequence is
calculated by multiplying worth by probability. The expected
worth of the decision is a total of the expected worths of its
consequences. The expert then selects the decision that
maximizes the expected worth. (Hart, 1986)





AQUINAS Kitto and Boose (1989)
FMS Aid Garg-Janardan and Salvendy
(1987)
KITTEN Shaw and Gaines (1987a)
KRITON Diederich, Ruhmann, and May
(1987)
KSSO Gaines (1987)
PEGASUS Shaw and Gaines (1987b)
This may be a very quick way of capturing an expert's
heuristics in some circumstances, but it has a serious
drawback. It relies on the expert's estimates of worth and
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probability. Describing their conclusion in terms of
probability theory is not an intuitive or natural way of
thinking (von Winterfeldt, 1988). Various methods have been
developed for eliciting probabilities from people but none has
proven universally acceptable (Hart 1986).
14. Machine Induction
There has been a good deal of controversy over whether
machine induction will prove to be a useful source of
knowledge or not. Some believe that the problem of extracting
deeply compiled procedural and semantic knowledge can be
dodged with this technology. This procedure has the expert
provide a set (training set) of examples of different types of
decisions from the domain. Also provided are the relevant
attributes that affect the decision. All this is fed as data
into a software inductive algorithm that produces the simplest
set of rules that can generate the examples. This allows for
an explanation of the decision process and provides
predictions of decisions for examples not in the training set.
(Berry, 1987)
Automatic induction can produce rule bases very
quickly. It may draw out deeply embedded or compiled
knowledge because the expert need not have a clearly
formulated explicit rule that is used when carrying out a
task. Indeed, the expert need not even be present, as the
training set may be drawn from documentation. (Berry, 1987)
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There are several disadvantages to machine induction.
Some domains do rot have a base of documentation or examples
that can be easily drawn upon. Additionally, what comes out
of the induction algorithm is only as good as what goes in.
The training set must represent the domain, and it must
contain the unusual or rare cases as well. A random sample
will not provide this. Induction algorithms (i.e., ID3)
cannot cope with uncertain or noisy domains. Further, the
rules that an expert uses will not be like those produced by
the algorithm. Machine induction produces rules that tend to
be more complex and difficult to understand and thus less
desirable for coding into expert systems. (Berry, 1987)
F. SUMMARY
The acouisition of knowledge from experts will remain a
"bottleneck" for some time to come. Yet, many of the steps
involved in the knowledge acquisition phase have benefitted
greatly from research over the last two decades. There are
frameworks for classifying knowledge and tasks, matching
problem-solving techniques to tasks, and representing
knowledge. But, the greatest problem remains the extraction
of knowledge from an expert. A plethora of techniques have
been focused upon this problem, but as this survey has shown,
none are wholly satisfactory and all have serious drawbacks.
See Tables 4 and 5 for a summarization of all the techniques.
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TABLE 4. DIRECT KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION TECHNIQUES
TECHNIQUE KNOWLEDGE TYPES DRAWBACKS
ACCESSED
Interviews Declarative 1. Subject to
articulation.
2. No deep know-
ledge
uncovered.
Questionnaires Declarative 1. Subject to
articulation.
2. No deep know-
ledge
uncovered.




3. Expert may not
recall all the
reasoning




Protocol Analysis Declarative 1. Subject to
articulation.
2. Affects task.
Drawing Closed Declarative 1. Requires expert
Curves introspection.
Inferential Flow Declarative 1. Requires expert
Analysis introspection.





TABLE 5. INDIRECT KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION TECHNIQUES
TECHNIQUE KNOWLEDGE TYPES DRAWBACKS
ACCESSED
Multidimensional Declarative 1. Tedious.










General Weighted Declarative, 1. Assumes an
Networks Some Procedural underlying
form.
Ordered Trees Declarative, 1. Introspection
from Recall Some Procedural and recall.
2. Based upon
assumptions.
Repertory Grid Declarative 1. No deep
Analysis knowledge.
2. Use of limited
(Personal constructs.
Construct 3. Difficult to
Theory) verify.
Decision Analysis Declarative, 1. Relies on
Some Procedural estimates of
probability and
worth.
Machine Induction Procedural 1. Training set
rarely
representative.







The direct techniques have as the greatest problem,
reliance upon an expert's ability to articulate what he or she
really knows. Five of the seven methods require the expert to
verbalize, either in interviews, or at some point during or
after a problem-solving task. The remaining two methods still
require articulation. Questionnaires are, for the most part
verbalization on paper, and the drawing of closed curves
forces the expert to explicitly indicate relationships where,
in some cases, none may exist. All of the direct methods
require the expert's introspection and mental search for the
correct data.
Research has indicated many problems in extracting the
knowledge of individuals. Knowledge may not be available to
awareness, and even if it is, it may not be expressible in
language. If it is expressible in a language, it may not be
understandable, for example, to a novice. Further, it is
entirely possible that expressed knowledge may be irrelevant,
incomplete, or incorrect. (Gaines, 1987)
The indirect methods of knowledge elicitation attempt to
circumvent reliance upon an expert's introspection and
articulation. Though the indirect techniques presented here
have demonstrated psychological validity in controlled
settings, they all have serious drawbacks to implementation.
These methods cause the knowledge engineer to become the
weakest link in the extraction process because it is he who
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must infer an underlying structure among the data obtained
from the expert. This means that the knowledge engineer must
be highly trained in psychological modelling techniques.
Further, if the underlying structure is not inferred "a
priori" so that the "correct" technique can be selected, the
data may not support the process.
Many elicitation methods have proven useful for tapping
into the declarative knowledge of an expert. Yet, there is no
satisfactory way of extracting procedural or semantic
knowledge. The indirect techniques present a "hit-or-miss"
proposition based on the validity of the underlying
assumptions. Empirical research into comparisons of
elicitation methods is still in its infancy, and the need
clearly exists for a good deal more. Until an empirically
derived data base of domains, tasks, knowledge extraction
techniques, and their interactions exist, the claims and
counter-claims for each technique will remain just that.
This survey indicates a need for an automated technique
based on a sound psychological model of expert thought
processes, that can extract deeply embedded procedural and
semantic knowledge. This technique should be natural to the
expert so that it does not force him or her into different
modes of reasoning. It should eliminate the knowledge
engineer, that translation through another person, so the
expert is enabled to interact directly with the process to
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create a knowledge base. A new technique should allow for a
graphic interface and graphic manipulation, as this is how
much of long term, deeply embedded memory may be stored. Many
automated knowledge acquisition tools have been developed, but
they are based on one or a combination of the techniques




Cognitive feedback is regarded as an effective tool for
the capture and representation of a person's mental model
(Doherty and Balzer, 1988). This chapter will provide the
justification for that assertion and explain how the mental
model can be captured. The theoretical foundations of
cognitive feedback, Brunswik's probabilistic functionalism and
its representation through the lens model are introduced and
summarized first (Hursch, Hammond, and Hursch, 1964; Tucker,
1964). Cognitive tasks and cognitive systems are defined and
their relation to the lens model illustrated.
Cognitive feedback is explained in detail and shown to be
superior to the other form of decision feedback, outcome
feedback. The different types of cognitive feedback will be
described as well as the various formats in which it can be
presented. Cognitive feedback has been put to many different
uses, and there is a moderate corpus of research on the
effectiveness of cognitive feedback. The results of these
studies will be summarized, and some issues and applications
for the future will outlined.
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B. PROBABILISTIC FUNCTIONALISM
Probabilistic functionalism is a description of the
process by which an organism adapts to an uncertain,
probabilistic environment, and how the tradeoffs it must make
to survive play a central role. Brunswik (1943) believed that
to understand the underlying forces guiding an organism's
behavior one must focus on the organism's achievement in
adapting to the environment. This involves a thorough study
and characterization of the environment, the organism in the
environment, and the means by which the adaptation occurs.
These ideas are salient to practitioners of knowledge
acquisition because their goals are to capture an expert's
mental model. The mental model has developed as a means of
adapting to, and imposing some order upon the environment.
A detailed analysis of the environment is necessary to any
explanation of an individual's judgmental processes. Tolman
and Brunswik (1935) have stressed that an organism, in its
normal interaction with the environment, must deal with many,
interdependent, diverse relations among variables (cues),
which may be partly relevant or irrelevant to its goals. The
cues are limited in t,~eir dependability and may be organized
in a variety of ways. There is considerable redundancy and
interchangeability among the cues. In short, the environment
is probabilistic.
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Given the many complex situations that can arise from a
probabilistic environment, the organism must adjust by
bringing to bear a variety of cognitive processes, such as
perception, thinking, and learning if it is to survive.
Crucial to this process of adjustment is feedback (Hogarth,
1981). If feedback is received and acted upon continuously,
the organism has access to a greater number of cues and
responses. The cues become more intersubstitutable. The
effect that a redundant environment has upon behavior was
stressed by Brunswik through the principle of vicarious
mediation:
Since there is no perceptual cue which would be
available under all circumstances or is completely
trustworthy... the perceptual system of higher organisms
must for most types of perceptual attainment develop what
the present writer has suggested calling an "or-
collective" or an "or-assemblage"... of mutually
interchangeable cues vicariously mediating distance or
other situational circumstances to the organism... Since
cues form a hierarchy just as do means, we may also speak
of a "cue-family-hierarchy"... (1955, p. 677)
The importance of this principle is apparent:
We may add that vicariousness of psychological cues
and means may be viewed as a special case of receiving or
sending messages through redundant, repetitive channels,
thus reducing the probability of errors, that is, the set
of possible causes, or effects, that could result in, or
be produced by, the type of event in question. Vicarious
functioning is thus indeed of the essence of behavior.
(Brunswik, 1955, p. 750)
Substitutions between interchangeable cues lead to equivalent
results. The organism orders the cues into a system that
enables it to make judgments about some object or the future.
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The vicarious functioning occurs within a certain
environmental context. As a result, Tolman and Brunswik
(1935) argued that more emphasis should be placed upon
studying the environment and the organism within that
environment, than the organism in isolation. The first step
toward this understanding must be to study the texture of the
relationships among cues in the tasks that require judgment.
Brunswik (1955) stated that the organism's (cognitive)
system and the environmental system should be described
symmetrically. This is represented in the lens model of
behavior (Figure 1). Brunswik described the lens model with
a principle of parallel concepts. Each concept on one side is
paralleled by an equivalent concept on the opposite side. The
cues on the task or ecological (environmental) side vary in
ecological validity and the cues on the organism's (cognitive)
side vary in cue utilization. The relations between cues and
distal variables (the criterion or object of interest) on the
ecological side may assume various forms, just as the
relations between cues and judgment on the cognitive side may
assume various forms.
C. THE LENS MODEL
Brunswik's lens model is a general construct that
graphically embodies the principle of parallel concepts and
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Figure 1. The lens model (Libby, 1981).
under uncertainty. The model can be viewed as an individual
judging an event or object (criterion), which cannot be
directly perceived, through a lens of cues. The relationship
of the cues to the criterion event and to the judge are
uncertain. The individual's interaction with the environment
may be described by several relationships such as those among
cues, those between the cues and the criterion event, those
between the cues and the individual's judgment, and those
between the criterion event and the individual's judgment.
(Brehmer, 1979)
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1. The Lens Model Equation
The version of the lens model presented here is the
regression formulation and is the one most widely used. The
model was quantified with regression analysis by Hursch,
Hammond, and Hursch (1964), Hammond, Hursch, and Todd (1964),
and Tucker (1964). The material presented here is drawn from
Libby (1981) who has further refined the model.
There are three elements to the model. The first is
the task environment defined by the cue set (XI, X2 , ... , Xk).
The second element is the criterion event, also called the
focal variable, on the left side of the model and denoted by
Ye* The third element is the judge's estimate of the event
and is denoted by Y, on the right side of the model. The
relationships among these elements (see Figure 1) are
summarized in the lens model equation.
The task environment is defined by the cue set (X,, X2,
X ) and the matrix of intercorrelations between the cues,
r,. The relationships of the cues to the criterion and of the
cues to the judgment are measured by both univariate and
multivariate correlations. The ecological validity of a cue
is measured by the univariate relationship oetween each cue
(Xi) and the criterion event (Ye) and is denoted by nie on the
left side of the model. This measures the relevance of the ith
cue to predicting the criterion event and is independent of
the other cues. The multivariate relationship between all the
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cues and the criterion event is determined by the following
linear regression model:
-Ye = a, + bleXi + b2eX 2 + ... + bkeXk, Ye = -Ye Ue-
The cues-criterion multivariate relationship is assessed by
the correlation of the criterion event (Ye) and the prediction
of the criterion event (^Ye) from the above model. The
measure is known as environmental predictability (Re=rye^ye)
and shows the relevance of the cue set to predicting the
event.
The right side of the model, the cognitive system, is
described in terms similar to that used for the left side, as
required by the principle of parallel concepts. The reliance
of the judge upon individual cues is measured by the
univariate relationship between the cue (Xi) and the response
or judgment (Yd. This is called the utilization coefficient
(rs) and may take a positive or negative value between zero
and one. An ignored cue is given a zero weight. The
multivariate relationship between all the cues and the
response is defined by the linear regression model:
_Ys = a, + bIsXI + b 2sX2 + .". + bksXk' Ys = ,Ys + us'
The cue-response multivariate relationship is assessed by the
correlation of the actual judgment (YO) with the model's
prediction of the judgment (^Ys). This measure is known as
the response linearity (RS=rysys) and may indicate
predictability or consistency of judgment.
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When the two regression models are compared, the
similarity of the decision maker's weightings of cues to the
environmental relationships can be assessed. This is done by
correlating the predictions of the two equations to form the
matching index (G=r.ye'Ys). If each linear model captures all
reliable variance in each system, the index can be regarded as
an overall measure of the accuracy of cue weighting or
utilization. This is because the effects of human
inconsistency and environmental unpredictability are
eliminated in the regressions.
The achievement index (ra=r~eys) summarizes the judge's
performance and shows the correspondence between the judge's
response and the environmental event. This measure provides
a direct ex post indicator of judgment accuracy. Achievement
can be explained in terms of the other components of the lens
model with the following equation: ra=GReRs. See Table 6 for
a summary of lens model components. Achievement depends on
three factors: (1) the weighting of cues relative to their
weighting in the environment (G is usually less than one
because most decision makers fail to use an optimal weighting
strategy, which is implicit in the environmental model); (2)
the predictability of the environment (Re is less than one
because the environment is not perfectly predictable); (3) the
predictability of the individual (R, is less than one because
decision makers are not perfectly consistent). When combined
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multiplicatively it is apparent that judgmental achievement
will not be high, which is consistent with empirical results.








Rs Response linearity Rys^ys
(predictability)
G Matching index r
r, Achievement ryeYs
2. Single Systems
Figure 1 illustrates the double systems paradigm, so
called because it involves analyses of the relations between
two systems. The cognitive system (right side of lens model)
is compared to the task system (left side of lens model).
Standing in contrast to the double system paradigm is the
single system paradigm. This involves analysis of only the
right side of the lens model as depicted in Figure 2. Studies
conducted within this framework analyze the relations between
a set of cues and a set of judgments with multiple regression
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Figure 2. The single system case (Libby, 1981).
D. A FRAMEWORK FOR COGNITIVE SYSTEMS AND COGNITIVE TASKS
Brunswik's probabilistic functionalism provides for a
distinction between proximal variables (cues) and a distal
variable (the criterion), and is particularly well suited to
tasks involving inference. Indeed, the proximal-distal
separation is the definition of an inference task. The
ability to make inferences is the ability to go beyond the
information given (cues) and make a conclusion about what
cannot be directly perceived (criterion). Brunswik assumes
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this proximal-distal variable relation is probabilistic in
nature, so inferences cannot be made with complete certainty
regarding the distal variable. There are many important tasks
containing uncertainty and all inference tasks are
probabilistic in nature. (Brunswik, 1955)
The lens model and statistical concepts can be used to
describe cognitive tasks and cognitive systems. This makes it
possible to handle the problem of uncertainty and to express
both the regularities and irregularities of each system.
Formal logic proves inadequate as a representation for this.
The principle of parallel concepts holds that both systems be
described with similar concepts (Brehmer, 1979).
1. Cognitive Tasks
A cognitive task is the process by which an individual
selects a focus and then obtains information about that focus.
Cognitive tasks do not exist independently of a person, they
arise from the person's desire to know something. The focal
variable (criterion) is most often not directly perceived by
the person who must find a set of cues (proximal variables)
upon which to base an inference of the state of the focal
variable. The person must conform to the structure of the
environment, as it applies to the focal variable, when
choosing the set of cues and learning to use them. Cognitive
tasks are therefore dependent on both the individual and the
environment. The implication cf this is that cognitive tasks
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will differ among individuals because each person will select
different foci and cues. (Brunswik, 1955)
A cognitive task, once defined, may be described in
terms of its formal characteristics, of which there are seven
dimensions divided into two classes. The first class groups
together the surface characteristics that relate to the nature
of the proximal variables (cues), as opposed to relations
between cues and focal variables. Surface characteristics
include the number of cues, their metric characteristics
(i.e., nominal or quantitative), and the intercorrelations
among the cues (i.e., the extent to which cues tend to go
together). (Brehmer, 1979)
The second class groups together the four system
characteristics. The first is the re7ative weights for the
cues (i.e., some may be more important than others). The
second is the functional relations between each cue and the
dista7 variable. The third refers to the integration ru7e for
integrating information from the cues into a single judgment
(i.e., additive, averaging, or configural). The fourth system
characteristic is the predictability of the system. System
predictability may be low, as when not all the cues are
available, the system is inherently unstable, or the criterion
event is far into the future. Alternatively, system
predictability may be high, as when all relevant cues are
available or there is little time lag. (Brehmer, 1979)
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2. Cognitive Systems
A cognitive system is a representation or a model of
what a person perceives in the environment. It is the
judgment process by which the person copes with their
surroundings and it is depicted by the right side of the lens
model. A description of a cognitive system details what cues
are used, the weights assigned to each cue, the functional
relations between the cues and the judgment, what principle is
used to combine the cues, and the system's predictability.
Also included in the definition is an account of the metric
level at which the cues are used. This may not be the same as
in the cognitive task because a person may be assigning a
quantitative interpretation to nonquantitative cues or vice
versa. (Brehmer, 1979)
It is important to note that the judgment process
itself does not function according to multiple regression or
analysis of variance. There is a good deal of empirical
evidence against this. But, considerable research suggests
that a simple linear model will often adequately explain the
judgments made by an individual. Hoffman (1960) referred to
the use of linear models as paramorphic representations of
judges. This means that the cognitive processes of
individuals do not actually compute weighted averages of cues
or variables, but rather these processes can be simulated or
described through the use of such weightings.
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E. FEEDBACK
An understanding of cognitive feedback (CFB) first
requires a definition of the term "feedback". As defined by
Doherty and Balzer:
While the term feedback (FB) has been used in a
variety of ways in different disciplines, by definition it
involves an environment that returns some measure of the
output of a system back to the system that produced that
output. The FB then allows the system to compare its
present state with an ideal state, to adjust itself in
light of that comparison, and bring itself closer to that
ideal state. (1988, p. 163)
For the purposes of this thesis that system is a person.
Hogarth (1981) notes the importance of feedback to
judgmental accuracy. Judgment is essentially a continuous
process that is predominately exerted to facilitate action.
The actions normally produce feedback that is immediately
available. This gives rise to a series of incremental
judgment-action-feedback loops that monitor progress during
activity. Feedback is therefore central to behavior. It
enhances an individual's ability to adapt because it reduces
any particular action's implied commitment.
1. Two Types of Decision Feedback: CFB and OFB
In decision and judgment literature, two types of
feedback have been identified: cognitive feedback and outcome
feedback (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, and Steinman, 1986).
Cognitive feedback returns some measure of a person's
cognitive output to help that person come to grips with the
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environment. In particular, an individual receives
information describing the relationships defined in the lens
model.
Outcome feedback, had in the past, always been assumed
to improve the accuracy of an individual's judgments. Outcome
Feedback (OFB) simply describes the accuracy or correctness of
a judgment. It is the presentation of Ye to an individual
immediately after that person produces Ys" Cognitive
feedback, on the other hand, returns information on the how
and why that supports the accuracy of a judgment. Given the
definition of feedback presented earlier, OFB is really not a
form of feedback at all, because it does not return
information that a system can use in adjusting its response to
the environment. (Doherty and Balzer, 1988)
Outcome feedback's effects have been studied
extensively, especially with multiple cue probability learning
(MCPL) experiments. In MCPL studies subjects are given sets
of cues and asked to make overall judgments. After making the
judgment they are presented with its accuracy but not with
information regarding relations between cues and criterion.
(Hammond et al, 1975)
2. CFB Versus OFB
Many studies have directly contrasted OFB with CFB.
For example, a study of security analysts participating in a
security analysis decision simulation by Jacoby, Mazursky,
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Troutman, and Kuss (1984), led to two important conclusions.
First, in an environment that permits decision makers to be
selective in the information they choose, not all will access
feedback information if it possesses only outcome value, which
fails to possess predictive or explanatory aspects. Second,
better performing decision makers are less likely to access
OFB than are poorer decision makers. This led to the
conclusion that OFB may be especially dysfunctional in a
complex, dynam~c environment.
Hammond and Summers (1972) have proposed a theory
stating that performance in cognitive tasks depends upon
acquisition of knowledge and cognitive control over knowledge
already acquired. Their studies suggest that OFB is an
impediment to the learning of complex inference tasks,
especially when the relations are complex and under conditions
of uncertainty. When OFB was removed, an increase in response
consistency (-Ys) was typical. When compared, under the same
conditions, to individuals receiving CFB, the CFB group
performed most accurately. Hammond and Summers' conclusion:
Furthermore, the evidence which suggests that
traditional, response oriented outcome feedback is an
impediment to cognitive control (and thus to performance)
also points to the facilitating effect of cognitive
material as feedback. This shift in conception of the
notion of feedback carries considerable practical as well
as theoretical significance, for it is now evident that
computer technology can be used to produce such
facilitating feedback. (1972, p. 66)
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There are some researchers who disagree with the above
conclusion. Klayman (1984) contends that the focus of
research has been on the perception of shapes and magnitudes
of cue-criterion functions and that use of these may not be
how people actually learn. The model building process itself
may be how people acquire knowledge and outcome feedback may
be an effective tool when applied to this. He argues for a
greater research effort directed toward the model building
process.
Despite some favorable reports on the effectiveness of
OFB, most of the current literature shows that OFB provides
little value and may even be detrimental to learning in
cognitively complex, uncertain, probabilistic environments.
Doherty and Balzer states, "The superiority of relational
information, or what has been loosely called CFB, over 'OFB'
has been confirmed many times" (1988, p. 176).
F. COGNITIVE FEEDBACK
1. Definition
Cognitive feedback is the feedback that contributes to
the exercise of control. It consists of cognitive material
rather than response-oriented material (OFB). OFB only
enables individuals to see that ttieir decision was in error,
but not why it was in error. If a person is to discover why
they were in error, they must have feedback that allows them
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to compare the properties of their cognitive system with the
properties of the task system that is being dealt with.
(Doherty and Balzer, 1988)
2. Types of CFB
Three types of information can be returned in the CFB
process: Task information (TI), cognitive information (CI),
and functional validity information (FVI). Task information
refers to the relationships between cues and criterion. It
represents the left side of the lens model (ecological or
environmental side). The TI that can be returned is Re (the
multiple correlation indicating overall task uncertainty), rie
(correlations between individual cues and criterion), and rij
(cue intercorrelations). (Balzer, Doherty, and O'Connor, 1989)
Cognitive information refers to the relationships
between cues and the person's judgments. This is the right
side of the lens model (decision maker side). As implied by
the principle of parallel concepts, CI largely mirrors TI
except that there is no equivalent to r,,. CI that can be
returned is ris (utilization coefficient) and Rs (response
linearity or predictability). Also, the conceptual
interpretations of consistency (right side) are very different
from predictability (left side). (Balzer et al, 1989)
Functional validity information are the relationships
between judgments and criterion. This is the achievement
index r, and the matching index G. (Balzer et al, 1989)
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TI, CI, and FVI can all be returned to an individual,
either alone or in combination with the others. However, for
an operation to be labeled cognitive feedback it must include
a cognitive component, that is, either CI, FVI, or both. Each
CFB measure can be returned to the individual in various
formats: verbally, graphically with bar-graphs or cue-
criterion function forms for example, or statistically by
correlation measures. See Table 7 for a summary of the types
of CFB. (Balzer et al, 1989)
Only CI is provided in the single system paradigm; the
concepts of TI and FVI are irrelevant. When CI is returned to
the decision maker it can be used as a cognitive aid to
heighten insight into one's own system of values as it applies
to a given environment. Most studies have suggested that
individuals may lack a high degree of insight into their
policies. Individual's descriptions of their policies are
often inaccurate and difficult to verbalize. This is one of
the reasons that CFB indexes and procedures were originally
developed. If the hypothesis that individuals lack insight
into their policies is true, it would justify development of
systems to provide them with CI. On the other hand, if
experts' insight into their policies is imperfect but not
totally absent, as one study relates, then presentation of CI,
though redundant, would provide an externalization of their
policy. (Balzer et al 1989)
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TABLE 7. TYPES OF COGNITIVE FEEDBACK.
TYPE MEASURE INTERPRETATION
Matching rye^Ys Extent to which task
Index (G) properties correctly
identified. Accuracy of
cue utilization.
Achievement ryeys Correspondence between
(ra) judge's decision and the
environmental event.
Response Rys-ys Predictability/censistency
Linearity of judgment. Extent to
(RS) which judge controls
execution of knowledge.
Environ- Rye^ye Relevance of the cue set to
mental predicting the criterion
Predict- event. Overall task
ability (Re) uncertainty.
Ecological rxiýe Relevance of the ith cue to
Validity (rie) predicting the criterion
event, independent of other
cues.
3. Presentation of CFB
Cognitive feedback can be presented in a variety of
forms. Brehmer and Svensson (1976) plotted a judge's last
block of judgments on the same graph as the true function
forms. Function forms (Cl) relate the cues to the judgment.
Todd and Hammond (1965) did the same thing and included the
means of the criterion and judgment values. Schmitt and
Levine (1977) presented transformations of beta values from
the regression equation. Many researchers have given solely
verbal descriptions (Deane, Hammond, and Summers, 1972) or
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verbal and graphical descriptions of function forms. All the
above methods have demonstrated effectiveness, but the most
frequently employed method is graphical.
Few studies exist that have directly compared the
variety of feedback formats. This may not be very important
because human beings appear well adapted to receiving input
either verbally or graphically, but people may differ on what
format works best. Therefore, if a cognitive aid is developed
for the purposes of feeding back lens model indexes, it would
be best to build in as much redundancy as possible. (Doherty
and Balzer, 1988)
Presentation of a particular CFB index (i.e., CI, TI,
FVI) or presentation in some format rather than another, may
have the effect of returning slightly different information to
individuals. Since CFB may be used to change a person's
judgment policy, or mental model, different combinations of
CFB may produce different mental models. (Doherty and Balzer,
1988)
The computer is, of course, the perfect tool for
analyzing an individual's judgment policy and for
instantaneously generating graphical feedback. Hammond et al
describes the use of a cognitive aid, "Persons exercising
their judgment can discover, immediately and in pictorial form
(by means of computer graphics), the properties of their own
judgmental system, as well as the properties of another
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person's judgmental system, and change those properties, if
they desire, with complete control" (1986, p. 67). Not only
can representations of cognitive systems be compared,
cognitive systems can also be compared with pictorial
representations of task systems as well. This enables one to
study the degree of match between the two systems, the right
and left sides of the lens model.
Time is an important consideration in the presentation
of feedback. Wickens (1984) notes that if feedback is
delayed, many salient factors that went into the decision
making process will have been forgotten. If the judge is
preoccupied with something else, there will probably be scant
attention paid to the feedback. Fischoff (1977) states that
th s can be exacerbated by cognitive conceit. By this,
individuals underestimate the information gained from
observing the effects of their decision and will overestimate,
in hindsight, the extent of prior knowledge. If the
discrepancy between what is known after a decision, and what
was thought to be known before the decision is slight, there
appears to be nothing wrong with the original decision making
process.
4. Applications of Cognitive Feedback
Much of thp evidence for the power and usefulness of
CFB has come from non-laboratory settings. This suggests that
there are a good many practical applications for CFB, many of
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which are now being realized. Cognitive feedback is also
being used in laboratory settings as a basic research tool.
Cognitive feedback has been used for training purposes
within the medical fields and may be useful to any
practitioner who must make multiple-cue judgments of distal,
incompletely discernable objects. As an example, TI + CI has
been presented by computer program to improve the diagnostic
accuracy of medical students evaluating urinary tract
infections. The same program has been used to improve the
achievement and tuning of diagnoses in streptococcal
infections. Cognitive feedback, as CI, has also been used to
increase agreement between specialists in a medical field
where there is much disagreement over proper treatment
(rheumatoid arthritis). (Balzer et al, 1989)
Cognitive feedback has been used in performance rating
training programs. Here, information (i.e., TI) is provided
to raters about which cues or behaviors should be regarded
during a rating session. The student's patterns of ratings
are compared to ratings provided by experts. This has been
shown to reinforce and improve multiple measures of rating
effectiveness. A technique such as this could conceivably be
used to prepare personnel screening boards for their task, or
for the training of portfolio managers, inspection and
auditing personnel, and even battlefield situation assessment
or conflict prediction/resolution tasks. (Balzer et al, 1989)
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Further examples for the application of CFB as TI come
from Balzer et al:
CFB as TI may be used to teach (a) selection
interviewers to differentially weight dimensions of
interviewees' performances; (b) stockbroker trainees to
use various indexes of company performance when making
sell or buy recommendations; (c) clinical trainees to
focus on certain aspects of a client's personal history,
test performance, or interview behaviors when making
diagnoses; ant' (d) medical students to examine and
integrate particular pieces of current and previous
medical history. (1989, p. 430)
More applications for cognitive feedback involve the
return of FVI in a manner that informs individuals about the
validity of their judgments. Those engaged in personnel
selection could be provided with some measure of the
relationship between their selection decisions and the
subsequent performance of the personnel. This information
could lead them to retain, change, or discard their personal
selection policies. This can be applied to the organizational
level as well. (Balzer et al, 1989)
5. Research on Cognitive Feedback
Many studies have been conducted to determine whether
CFB really "works". A problem with comparing all the studies
is that several measures have been used to assess CFB. Some
have used the common lens model statistics of R,, rV, and G as
dependent variables. Others have used variants on these
statistics or have added self reports from users of CFB.
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Three criteria are used by Balzer et al (1989), to
integrate all the results from studies on CFB. The first is
reaction criteria that includes self reports, informal
testimonials, or formal scale responses. Reaction criteria is
primarily qualitative in nature and most studies in this area
have reported favorable reactions to CFB. The second,
behavioral criteria, appraises change in some specific feature
of a person's performance. The changes may include insight
into one's own policy, consistency of policy usage, or task
learning improvement. When used as dependent variables R,, ra,
and G belong in this second category. The third, results
criteria, measures whether CFB resulted in improvement beyond
the CFB task and as such has not received much examination.
Most studies have dealt with behavioral criteria.
Three behavioral criteria are represented in the lens
model: knowledge (G, the matching index), control (Rz,
response linearity or predictability), and achievement (rd).
Studies have looked at each of these behavioral criteria as if
they were separate and others have explored the interactions
between knowledge and control as it affects achievement.
Several studies assessing the impact of CFB on
knowledge, have found that providing individuals with TI + CI
have led to significant increases in linear matching. In one
project r, (r; = Grs), which assesses the extent to which an
individual can predict linear variance in the environment, was
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significantly higher for those receiving CFB than OFB. Still,
some other experiments providing feedback as TI and extensive
CFB (r 1 ,, r1 ,, RS, Re) led to little or no increase in
knowledge. Most studies however, show that CFB will lead to
increases in knowledge. See Table 8 for a surmnry of studies
on the impact of feedback on knowledge (Balzer et al, 1989).
TABLE 8. STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF CFB UPON KNOWLEDGE.
Type of Feedback Results Study
CFB + OFB TI+CI+OFB > TI+OFB Schmitt, Coyle,
2 OFB> CI+OFB and King (1976)
CFB < CFB+OFB • Schmitt, Coyle,
No FB and Saari (1977)
CFB, OFB TI t TI+CI+FVI > Nystedt and
OFB Magnusson (1973)
CFB, No FB CFB > Jo FB Fero (1975)
TI + CI CFB > OFB Adelman (1981)
No increase Clover (1979)
CFB > OFB Lindell (1976)
CFB > OFS Hoffman, Earle
and Slovic (1981)
TI, TI + CI + FVI TI+CI+FVI ; TI Galbraith (1984)
CI, TI + CI TI+CI > TI > CI Schmitt et al
(1976)




TI + FVI Increased Newton (1965)
TI + CI + FVI Increased Newton (1965)
TI + CI + FVI, TI+CI+FVI TI+FVI Steinmann (1974)
TI + FVI > OFB
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CFB has been evaluated with respect to its impact on
control (R,). One of the methods employed was to examine the
effect of CFB on a person's ability to employ policies in a
consistent fashion. Results are mixed, but generally CFB has
produced more significant increases in control than not. In
another study, CFB has significantly improved control at a
Veteran's Administration drug dependency unit. Similar
results were reported in a study of learning and training in
undergraduate students. OFB has also been shown to decrease
R, when presented with CFB. See Table 9 for a summary of
research studies on the impact of CFB upon control (Balzer et
al 1989).
When CFB is examined for its effect on achievement
several studies show significant improvement in r,. It has
been demonstrated that ra is highest when TI + CI is received,
second highest when only TI is received, and lowest when OFB
is presented. One study showed that r, was significantly
lower for OFB individuals than for either CFB or CFB + OFB.
See Table 10 for a summary of research studies on the impact
of CFB on achievement (Balzer et al, 1989).
Most studies indicate that CFB improves behavioral
criteria. It reinforces linear matching of an individual's
policy with the linear environment, linear consistency, and
achievement. Knowledge (G) and cognitive control (Rs) are
both significantly increased by CFB, and in an environment of
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TABLE 9. STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF CFB UPON CONTROL.
Type of Feedback Results Study
CFB + OFB No effects Schmitt et al
(1976)
CFB > CFB + OFB Schmitt et al
(1977)
CFB, OFB Decreased Balke, Hammond
and Meyer (1973)
TI ; TI+CI+FVI Nystedt and
OFB Magnusson (1973)
CFB, No FB CFB > No FB Fero (1975)
TI + CI CFB > OFB Adelman (1981)
No increase Clover (1979)
CFB % PDF > OFB Hoffman et al
(1981)
CFB > OFB Lindpll (1976)
TI, TI + CI + FVI TI+CI+FVI = TI Galbraith (1984)
CI, TI + CI No studies
CI No studies
TI No studies
FVI Increased Newton (1965)
TI + CI + FVI Increased Newton (1965)
TI + CI + FVI, TI+CI+FVI Steinmann (1974)
TI + FVI TI+FVI > OFB
given predictability, achievement (r, = GReRs) depends on these
two components. This is because Re has little effect: it
appears that as environmental predictability increases so does
an individual's predictive ability. To summarize the effect
upon behavioral criteria Balzer et al states:
. .the lens model equation is not only a statistically
correct decomposition of achievement, it is also an
analytical tool that gives us insight into the dynamics of
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achievement. People are capable of improving their
achievement by increasing both knowledge and control; CFB
is a means of enhancing both. (1989, p. 422)
TABLE 10. STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF CFB UPON ACHIEVEMENT.
Type of Feedback Results Study
CFB + OFB No effects Schmitt et al
(1976)
CFB > CFB+OFB Schmitt et al
(1977)
TI+CI+FVI : TI+CI+ Todd and Hammond
FVI+OFB > OFB (1965)
CFB, OFB TItTI+CI+FVI>OFB Nystedt and
Magnusson (1973)
CFB, No FB CFB > No FB Balke et al(1973)
CFB > No FB Fero (1975)
TI + CI CFB > OFB Adelman (1981)
No increase Clover (1979)
CFB > OFB Hoffman et al
(1981)
CFB > OFB Lindell (1976)
TI, TI + CI + FVI TI+CI+FVI 2 TI Galbraith (1984)
CI, TI + CI TI+CI > TI > OFB Hammond and Boyle
(1971)




CI Decreased Flack and Summers
(1971)
Increased Stang (1985)
TI + FVI Increased Newton (1965)
TI + CI + FVI Increased Newton (1965)
Increased Stang (1985)
TI + CI + FVI, TI+CI+FVI Steinmann (1974)
TI + FVI TI+FVI > OFB
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6. Issues
a. contributions of Individual CFB Components
Only a few experiments or studies have
examined the individual effects of TI, CI, and FVI on improved
performance. The results so far are not conclusive enough to
show which component contributes most to judgment policy
learning and understanding. Trends however, suggest that TI
may be the primary contributing component and that CI may be
of lesser value. It must be noted that most experiments are
of limited cognitive complexity and that as complexity
increases so may the contribution of CI. (Balzer et al, 1989)
b. The Role of CI
The greatest future growth within the field of
CFB may come f rom the use of CI. According to Doherty and
Balzer:
We believe that the future growth of CFB applications
will be in the measurement of utilities rather than in
modelling environments. We see more people benefitting
from CFB, specifically the CI component, by an increased
understanding of, and ability to communicate, what they
personally value ... rather than from an improved
prediction of an uncertain environment ... If the promise
of wide availability of CFB software packages for general
purposes is fulfilled, there may be another benefit to
users. Since the user will have to decide upon the
dimensions (or cues) and their '.evels, the user will not
only have the benefit of having to make trade-offs,
receiving CFB, etc. , but will also have the benefit of the
insights gained from the decomposition of the problem




Policy PC: Judgment Analysis Software1 is a
program written for IBM and compatible personal computers.
This is an example of software developed on the lens model
single system paradigm, using statistical methods to make
models of human judgment. The program enables the user to
construct a series of problem characterizations or scenarios
and to then extract judgments about them. It calculates the
regression measures and returns cognitive feedback as graphic
displays. It can analyze the judgments of up to eight
decision makers, use up to eight cues (text or numeric) in 100
cases, and compute the statistics for each task, judge, and
policy.
Policy PC and similar programs were not intended
for use in research into expert system development. Though it
has some features that would b= desirable in such an effort,
it lacks some properties necessary for expert system
development. For example, this program will not allow an
expert to iteratively refine his or her model. It does not
have a method for defining a cue in terms of other "subcues"
in a hierarchical manner. Cues cannot be temporarily
modified, added, or deleted so that a model can be quickly
refined in response to changing feedback. The feedback (a
Executive Decision Services, Inc., Albany, NY
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combination of TI + CI), as presented in simple text mode, is
not readily assimilable or intuitive. Additionally, it is not
accompanied by much textual explanation, an important form of
feedback. Policy PC is also incapable of capturing an
expert's initial impressions of cue correlations, as a
"starting point", should the expert already have a feel for
what his or her policy is.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter presented a modern psychological theory that
explains the manner in which information is used in decision
making. Brunswik's probabilistic functionalism and the
quantification methods provided by subsequent researchers,
provide a mathematical means of modeling mental processes.
This simple and straightforward way of constructing a linear
model provides a technique for testing hypotheses about the
way individuals combine information and exercise judgment.
A major contribution of this theory is to stress
representativeness in research design. The experiments and
investigations must have an ecological validity or "true-to-
life" modeling if they are to be at all successful in
discovering or representing judgmental processes. With
respect to representative design, Hoffman observed, "In
focusing upon the individual as the unit of research while at
the same time preserving methodological rigor it becomes
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possible to achieve a level of r3ychological description which
would otherwise be quite difficult" (1960, p. 131).
The effects of cognitive feedback have been extensively
studied for almost 30 years. The majority of the research
findings demonstrate that when cognitive feedback is given to
an individual it will improve performance with respect to
knowledge, control, and achievement. This indicates that
cognitive feedback is a useful tool for representing a
person's mental model and for altering that mental model as
well. This is only effectively accomplished when information
regarding relationships is returned to an individual rather
than information concerning outcomes.
The wide variety of settings in which cognitive feedback
has been successively used show that broad applicability is
possible. It can be used to resolve interpersonal or
interorganizational conflicts. It also can allow for the
resolution of intrapersonal conflicts, that is, it can clarify
and enhance an individual's view into his or her own value
system. Cognitive feedback can improve a person's judgment
and it can improve learning.
The computer is the logical device for the employment of
cognitive feedback in analyzing judgment policy and providing
the feedback in a timely manner. The variety of possible
formats and methods allow the feedback process to be tailored
to an individual. The following chapter provides a high level
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description of a proposed cognitive feedback system for use in
knowledge acquisition for expert systems.
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR AN AUTOMATED KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION
TOOL USING COGNITIVE FEEDBACK
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter established the validity of cognitive
feedback as a tool for enhancing the learning process and for
understanding how an individual may perceive his or her
environment. More importantly, empirical studies have shown
cognitive feedback to be useful in capturing a person'c policy
or mental model. Since this is based upon Brunswik's
probabilistic functionalism, depicted in the lens model, the
expert's policy or knowledge can be represented as a simple
numerical model (linear equation). (Hursch et al, 1964;
Hammond et al 1964; Tucker, 1964)
This chapter proposes an automated knowledge acquisition
tool known as KARCOF, Know7edge Acquisition and Representation
with COgnitive Feedback. The tool is described with state
transition diagrams and computer screens, set within the
context of a task that evaluates personnel performance. The
program interacts with an expert personnel evaluator (user) to
elicit a policy that will determine the promotability of
individuals within a particular field of exp'rLisb. KARCOF
uses the single system paradigm and through presentation of
cognitive feedback in graphical form, allows the expert to
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iteratively refine their policy. When the expert is satisfied
that the program has successfully captured their polic" or
knowledge, it is stored or represented as a numerical model in
a linear regression equation.
KARCOF is more than a knowledge acquisition tool, it also
can be considered as the developing core of a Knowledge
Support System (KSS). KSS's encompass tools for knowledge
engineering and support for human knowledge processes. KARCOF
can be used toward this end by returning an individual's
policies, or by enabling them to clarify a decis~on making
process. KARCOF has several other characteristics of a KSS.
These include domain independeince (cognitive feedback has
shown broad applicability with respect to tasks (Balzer et al,
1989)), direct interaction with the expert, provision for
validation, a sound theoretical foundation, and the ability to
incorporate different forms of knowledge and relationships
between knowledge. (Shaw and Gaines, 1987a)
B. SPECIFICATION
A top level view of how the KARCOF program operates is
illustrated by Figure 3. This is a state transition diagram
that uses Wasserman's (1985) methodology for specifying and
implementing interactive information systems. The following
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-- Nodes are shown by a circle and represent a stable state
awaiting some user input. A node displays a message.
-- Arcs are shown by arrows that connect the nodes to one
another. The arc is a state transition caused by some
user input. The arc is labeled by the input or variable
assignment that causes the transition.
-- An operation is shown by a small square with "ca" (call
action) and is associated with an integer that
differentiates the actions. It may be associated with
a transition to show a particular action that is taken
when an arc is traversed. The action also may be
associated with more than one arc.
-- A subconversation is shown by a rectangular box with an
associated diagram name. It is a lower level diagram or
module to which control is passed. The new diagram is
traversed to the exit and control is then returned to
the top level.
-- The "+" denotes return to a previous node without
intervening user input.
-- The "0" denotes resumption of a program after it has
paused for access to the help feature.
Each node in Figure 3 represents a computer screen and each
rectangle represents another diagram. All are included in
subsequent figures to illustrate how an expert would use this
tool.
1. Setup and Initial Steps
The session begins with the user entering the data
that will identify this knowledge base when the session is
complete. The first node in Figure 3 is the "Setup" phase and
it is here that the purpose or name of the policy, name of the
expert, and name of the file in which the data is to be
stored, is entered. The elicitation begins with the user
specifying the number of cues, up to a maximum of eight, that
will be used in the model, as shown in Figure 4. Input is via













Figure 4. Screen for specifying the number of cues.
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accessed by mouse or cursor keys. Available functions, at any
particular step, are denoted by an asterisk. At the top of
the screen is a message bar showing what is required for the
present step and how to move to the next phase.
The next step, Figure 5, requires the user to specify
the nature of the cues in a popup window. There are two
available choices: cardinal (for a discontinuous scale), and
numeric (for continuous values). For each cue the user enters
a name and a value range. In this example, each cue can
assume integer values between one and ten inclusive, though
all the cues need not have the same scale. As an anchor point
for the scale, one means "worst" or "least desirable", and ten
means "best" or "most desirable". If the user desires
additional information on any step, help is always available
through a popup, scrollable, context sensitive window, as in
Figure 6.
When determining the number of cues to be used, the
expert should always be mindful that only the minimum
necessary for the judgment should be entered. Judges will
most often include too many cues: the important ones and some
unimportant ones (Stewart, 1988). Feedback after the first
iteration or so should suggest to the user which cues are used
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Figure 6. Context sensitive, popup help window.
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At the next step, Figure 7, the user enters his or her
estimate of the correlation between each combination of cues.
Since humans deal poorly with statistical estimations, a
graphical representation as a number line, is provided for the
entry of estimates. Figure 7 shows the cue pair X,-X2 to have
a weak positive correlation, XI-X3 to have a strong positive
correlation, and X2-X3 to have a weak negative correlation.
This step is necessary because the principle of parallel
concepts states that cues in the cognitive task should match
cues in the cognitive system. The environmental cues are
unknown, of course, so they must be estimated by the expert.
These subjective cue intercorrelations may be reasonably
accurate if the expert has observed occurrences of similar
correlations in real life over many cases (Stewart, 1988).
This example uses four cues, so several more screens of
correlations would be necessary.
2. Case Generation and Judgments
To capture an expert's policy or knowledge, KARCOF
must obtain a series of judgments made by the expert over a
set of representative cases. Stewart (1988) has set forth
some guidelines for creating an algorithm that determines the
number of cases necessary to obtain a statistically stable
model of the expert's policy. The requirement for stability
sets a lower bound on the number of cases required. However,

















Figure 7. Screen for entering the correlations between
combinations of cues.
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upon the complex interactions of three factors:
-- The number of cues, which when increased requires an
increase in the number of cases to maintain stability.
-- The fit of the model to the judgments as shown by
the multiple correlation. If the fit is good, fewer
cases are required.
-- The Cue intercorrelat ions, when zero, result in greatest
stability. If correlations exist, then more cases will
be required.
Various levels of each of these factors affects the standard
error of the regression coefficient (SE), which can be
interpreted as an estimate of the instability of the model.
A high SE suggests greater instability and unreliability of
the analysis.
The knowledge engineer administering KARCOF must
choose an appropriate SE before beginning an elicitation
session. An SE of .1 is generally relevant for most
circumstances, and when combined with a known level of cue
intercorrelations, a suitable number of cases can be
determined. Past research has shown that judgments over 30
cases will yield a statistically stable model with this
example's number of cues and level of intercorrelation.
Generally, 30 cases for the first four cues and 5 cases for
each additional cue will yield a stable model. (Stewart, 1988)
Cook (1976) as cited in Stewart (1988), submits that
the standard statistical assumptions may not apply to this
application (judgment analysis). He found that stability
could be achieved with fewer cases than is suggested by
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statistical theory. If true, then the above procedure will be
too conservative. Cook's findings have yet to be duplicated,
but the above algorithm should yield the appropriate accuracy.
KARCOF's algorithm, after determining the number of
cases, generates a random number matrix from a clock time
seed. The matrix is an assignment of a random number to each
cue over the set of required cases. The algorithm then
performs the appropriate statistical operations upon the
matrix to compute the standard error and the cue
intercorrelations. These two measures are then compared
against the SE specified by the knowledge engineer and the cue
intercorrelations specified by the expert. If there is not a
resulting match, within a certain tolerance range (say, 10%),
to prevent an inordinate number of iterations, the above steps
are repeated. When a match of SE and cue intercorrelations is
finally achieved, the cue values are rescaled according to the
range prescribed by the expert.
The final matrix of cue values over the prescribed set
of cases is then presented to the expert, as in Figure 8. The
expert performs a judgment for each case and enterc it in the
"Judgment (Y,)' column of the matrix. The example in Figure
8 would require another screen of 14 judgments to be executed
before this phase is complete. An expert can generally make
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When the expert has completed all the necessary
judgments, control of the program is passed to the "Feedback"
subconversation or module, Figure 9 (also see Figure 3). All
the statistical measures required by the single system
paradigm are computed and the expert is then given a choice of
how he or she wishes to view the feedback, as shown in Figure
10. Three choices, with a sample of each are shown in this
step:
-- The relationship (7ens) model is a graphical
representation of all cues and subcues. Strength of cue
correlation to judgment and of subcue to parent cue is
shown by the thickness of the connecting line.
-- Function forms represent the relation between a single
cue and the judgment. it is presented on a simple X-Y
graph.
-- Decision weights are the standard regression
coefficients, or beta weights, of each cue expressed in
percentages. This eliminates differences due to units
of measure between each cue and estimates the direct
impact a cue has on a judgment if the other cues are
held constant. The data is presented on a simple
vertical bar chart. A negative decision weight is shown
below the X-axis.
The expert views the feedback in Figure 11 , and has the option
of seeing each type in succession. A detailed verbal
explanation of each form of feedback is available by accessing
the Help facility. When finished viewing the feedback, the
user may revise the cues in any manner, revise the judgments,
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Figure 11. Screen for viewing feedback.
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4. Validation
Should the expert feel satisfied the feedback
indicates that his or her policy may be effectively captured,
the next step is to select "Knowledge Base", an option in
Figure 11. Control of the program is then passed to the
"Knowledge Base" subconversation or module, Figure 12. KARCOF
generates another random number matrix for each cue and case,
and the requirement for matching cue intercorrelations and a
matching SE is again satisfied. KARCOF applies the expert's
captured policy, in a multiple regression equation, to predict
a judgment for each case, Figure 13.
The expert inspects the machine generated judgments
and if satisfied, elects to save the knowledge base and
terminate the session, Figure 14. However, KARCOF may not
have produced satisfactory judgments, indicating to the expert
that his or her policy has not yet been faithfully captured.
If this is the case the expert may elect to save the knowledge
base and continue the session at another time, or revise the
cue set and subsequently do another iteration of cue
correlations, judgments, and feedback.
5. Refinement
After viewing feedback from the first set of
judgments, the expert may choose to rejudge the original set
of cases. He or she may have under or overemphasized certain
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that does not truly reflect the expert's policy. In Figure 11
the expert selects "Revise Judgments" to return and rejudge
the original set of cases. When completed, feedback is
accessed again. The user may indefinitely iterate in this
fashion until satisfied with the feedback and validation of
the model.
An alternative to rejudging the original cue set,
which may not produce the desired feedback, is to alter the
parameters of the model. When the user selects "Revise Cues"
in Figure 11 four options present themselves: add a cue,
delete a cue, "explode" a cue, and edit a cue. Should the
user choose to add a cue, control of the program is passed to
the "Add Cue" subconversation or module, Figure 15. The user
is prompted for the number of additional cues to incorporate
into the model, Figure 16, and for the names and value ranges
of the new cues, Figure 17. After this step the expert may
further refine the model by deleting, exploding, or editing
cues or may proceed to correlate and judge the cues again.
Another option in the refinement process is to delete a
cue. The expert may choose to do this if he or she considers
a cue to be unimportant, contributing little or even
detracting from the final decision. In Figure 18 the expert
is asked which cues to delete. Afterward, the refinement
process may, continue, or the cue combinations may be
recorrelated and judged.
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Figure 16. Screen for specifying the number of additional
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Figure 18. Screen for deleting a cue.
A third option in the refinement process is to
"explode" a cue. Control of the program is passed to the
"Explode" subconversation or module, then a cue can be
hierarchically defined in terms of lower level subcues, as
shown in Figure 19. This module contains processes and
screens that are virtually identical to that of the main
program. The only difference is that a parent cue is now
regarded as a judgment or decision. A regression model,
formulated in terms of -he subcues, is created to define the
parent cue through the same operations of cue correlation,
case generation, judgment, feedback, refinement, and
validation.
The last option in the refinement process is to edit
a cue. When "Edit Cue" is selected, control of the program is
passed to the "Edit Cue" subconversation or module, Figure 20.
The user is given a choice of which cue to modify. The name
of the cue, Figure 21, and the value range, Figure 22, may be
altered. The expert may continue the refinement process or go
to the steps of cue correlation, judgment, feedback, and
validation.
C. SUMMARY
KAPCOF is a highly interactive program that can provide an
expert with instantaneous feedback to his or her decisions.
Parameters of the decision model can be altered dynamically
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Figure 22. Screen for changing the value range of a cue.
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feedback. This is expected to eliminate the negative and
counterproductive aspects of delayed feedback. If feedback is
not immediate, its effectiveness will be diminished, as many
factors that went into the decision making process may be
forgotten or attenuated. The expert's mind is invariably
preoccupied with something else if the feedback arrives late.
(Wickens, 1984)
The ability of KARCOF to define a hierarchical model is
more reflective of actual decision making processes.
Decisions may not always be based upon a single layer of cues.
Many situations may be dependent on several decisions, some of
which impinge on others in a hierarchical manner.
A program such as KARCOF, when finally implemented, should
allow the domain expert to assume many functions currently
performed by a knowledge engineer. Table 11 summarizes the
steps in KARCOF. This will result in enhanced quality of the
knowledge base and one that is more reflective of the domain
expert's mental model. The knowledge engineer's function
would be redefined to that of a facilitator with in-depth
technical knowledge of the tool. He or she would handle some
refinement in the form of the knowledge base and whatever
special situations in coding or coordination that invariably
arise. The expert would no longer be confined by the focus of
the knowledge engineer on implementation and representation
problems.
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TABLE 11. SUMMARY OF THE STEPS IN KARCOF.
Step Action Figure
1 Setup. Name the 3
policy, expert,
and file.
2 Specify the number 4
of cues.
3 Specify nature, 5
name, and range of
cues.
4 Specify cue 7
correlations.
5 Judge a set of 8
generated cases.
6 Specify form of 10
feedback.
7 View feedback. 11
8 Validate knowledge 13
base.
9 Save knowledge 14
base or iterate 16
between steps 2-8: 17
Add Cue, Explode 18
Cue, Delete Cue, 21




A major goal of the knowledge acquisition process is to
determine what a domain expert knows and uses to solve
problems. An understanding of the different types of
knowledge that exist is an important first step toward this
goal. Chapter II surveyed four types of knowledge:
declarative, procedural, semantic, and episodic. Of
particular interest, when considering expertise, are the
procedural and semantic types of knowledge.
Procedural knowledge presents especially difficult
problems for the knowledge acquisition process. This is due
to its highly compiled and automated nature. Knowledge that
was once declarative is combined with other types of
knowledge; then refined, tuned, strengthened, and integrated
into the expert's overall knowledge base. The facts, rules,
and concepts that comprise procedural knowledge are
represented in a more abstract and solution-oriented manner.
These cognitive changes have a beneficial impact on a person's
ability to use the information, but negatively impact an
individual's ability to consciously access the information.
The inability of experts to verbalize about their cognitive
processes is well documented.
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Many different techniques have been developed in an effort
to capture expert knowledge. Chapter II presented 14 of
these, half which can be considered "direct" techniques, and
half which can be considered "indirect". Direct techniques
rely on some form of verbalization or introspection by the
individual. These methods are only effective at illuminating
the declarative aspects of knowledge and they work poorly with
procedural knowledge. The "indirect" techniques rely less on
verbalization and more on methods that attempt to describe the
underlying forms or organization (mental models) of the
knowledge. A problem with the indirect techniques is that all
assume, a priori, some underlying form. These methods can
only succeed to the extent that the expert's underlying mental
model parallels the assumed forms.
Many cognitive scientists hypothesize that human thinking
is a multi-representational system (Rouse and Morris, 1986).
Each aspect of the represented environment is mapped into the
representation best suited to a particular use or domain. It
is apparent that since the indirect techniques of Chapter II
assume an underlying form, they are capable of representing
but one model.
Chapter III presented Brunswik's probabilistic
functionalism theory that explains how pieces of information
or cues, may be used by a person in a decision making process.
The cues are viewed as less than dependable, and they exist
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within a probabilistic environment. Depending on the task at
hand, the cues may be combined and used in a multitude of
ways. The theory is operationalized through use of the lens
model that graphically represents how an expert may combine
cues when an inference is made about some object or event in
the future. Each different arrangement of cues may be
considered a representation of a different mental model.
Therefore, the lens model can represent far more than the
single models of Chapter II's indirect techniques.
The lens model also provides a convenient way to combine
an expert's cognitive system (mental model representation)
with representations of the environment and the task, into a
single overarching model. Statistical analysis techniques
allow for comparisons and predictions between each of the
systems depicted in the lens model. Measurements of the
decision maker's achievement, predictability, and the match
with the environment are possible.
When the lens model is employed in the single system
paradigm, the expert's cognitive system, or mental model, is
represented. Cognitive feedback, the return of some aspects
of the decision output to the decision maker, can be used to
capture and even change the expert's working mental model.
Chapter III described in detail the types of cognitive
feedback that can be returned and a summary of studies that
have examined the effectiveness of each.
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The utility of cognitive feedback is well documented, as
are comparisons with the otner type of decision feedback,
outcome feedback. Outcome feedback may have a detrimental
impact on cognitive processes whereas cognitive feedback has
shown a positive and constructive effect on cognitive
processes.
Cognitive feedback has been successfully used in a variety
of fields that involve training and learning. It has also
been used to resolve conflicts among individuals and
organizations by providing each party with a view of what they
value most. Computers have been used with these examples to
capture the individual's policy or knowledge, and display
feedback in graphical form.
B. FINAL REMARKS
The above summary addressed the first and second
objectives of the thesis. The first was to discover what gaps
exist in current knowledge acquisition methodologies. A
survey of the techniques revealed that there appears to be no
reliable technique for capturing an expert's procedural
knowledge or mental model in general.
The second objective was to determine whether cognitive
feedback is appropriate as a tool for filling the gaps
identified in the current techniques. This study has found
ample evidence that cognitive feedback and the lens model may
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be effective in capturing a variety of mental models, and with
that, an expert's procedural knowledge.
The third objective of this study was to determine how, in
an operational sense, cognitive feedback could be employed to
extract an individual's knowledge. Chapter IV addresses this
goal through the description of a proposed automated knowledge
acquisition tool that uses cognitive feedback. The program
can be used directly by an expert without the intervention of
a knowledge engineer. The expert furnishes the program with
the number of cues and cue intercorrelations used in a
decision making process. Based on this, and a standard error
suitable for statistical stability specified by a supervising
knowledge engineer, the program generates a number of cases.
The expert then enters a numerical judgment for each case.
The program calculates the necessary statistical measures and
presents cognitive feedback in graphical form. If the expert
is not satisfied with the feedback he or she may revise
previous judgments or alter the parameters of the problem.
This may continue in an iterative manner until the expert is
convinced that the computer has captured a workable
representation of their knowledge.
C. APPLICABLE TASKS
Cognitive feedback appears to have broad applicability
irrespective of domain or problem solving technique. As shown
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in Chapter II, many knowledge acquisition tools form a
specific link between a problem solving method and an
application task category. Cognitive feedback however, due to
its general nature, may work with a number of problem solving
techniques. It is also particularly well suited to inference
tasks since the lens model, with its proximal-distal variable
separation, is the very definition of an inference task.
Cognitive feedback could be used in personnel selection
boards, or in tasks that rate the performance of individuals.
It could be used for complex learning situations such as
nuclear reactor operation or anti-submarine operations. Many
other possible applications present themselves:
-- Economic forecasting;
-- Practice in battlefield situation assessment;
-- Conflict resolution;
-- Auditing;
-- Security risk assessment;
-- Law: Case evaluation, litigation risk;
-- Medical diagnosis;
-- Hardware diagnosis.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Coding of the automated knowledge acquisition program is
the subject of a follow-on study to this thesis. Once the
prototype has been developed the logical next step involves
empirical studies of its effectiveness in capturing procedural
knowledge. Empirical studies should also be conducted to
determine what domains or tasks, within the Department of
Defense, would benefit from the development of this tool.
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The primary goal of a knowledge acquisition tool, whether
automated or manual, is to represent knowledge for ultimate
inclusion into a working expert system. Follow-on research
should take the knowledge captured by cognitive feedback, as
linear equations, and combine it with an effective inference
mechanism in an expert system. An alternative would be to
transform this captured knowledge into a form that can be used
by an existing inference engine in an expert system.
Additional areas of research should investigate the
intricacies of dealing with uncertainty. There are two
aspects to this problem. First, considering the emphasis that
probabilistic functir-• ism places upon the probabilistic
nature of the env r .,ment, researchers have yet to devise a
means of representing uncertainty with the lens model. Re and
R. represen4 point estimates of overall error but a means of
represenLing error bands around parameters is lacking. Some
parameters that should be treated in this way are the
estimates of ecological validities, utilization coefficients,
and r.. Second, methods of handling uncertainty must be
worked into the expert system that uses knowledge, in linear
equations, captured by cognitive feedback.
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